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Abstract:  The U.S. Army has undergone extreme transformation to meet new 
national security needs of the nation due to the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  In order 
to meet the needs of Soldiers and families exposed to increased stressors, the Army 
behavioral health system has undergone much transformation as well. The Army Social 
Work Care Manger Program (CMP) is one program recently developed to enhance Army 
behavioral health services to this population.  It provides care for Soldiers and their 
families who experience psychological or interpersonal difficulties throughout the 
deployment cycle.  This study investigates the ability of this new program to create 
effective services throughout several locations across the Army.  More specifically, the 
study evaluates the extent to which the CMP has been implemented as intended, reaches 
the target population and accomplishes the intended tasks.  Soldier survey data, multiple 
Care Manager (CM) activity reports, interviews and focus groups were analyzed in a 
triangulated methodology.  CMPs studied were found to reach the target population and 
address target issues across installations; however, senior enlisted as well as white male 
Soldiers appeared to be exposed to trauma at higher rates than they received treatment.  
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Burnout, lowered health benefits, overtasking, and recommendations for program 
formalization through manuals were identified as areas of program development.   
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 The Army Social Work Care Manager Program (CMP) was implemented 
internationally by the United States Army Medical Department (AMEDD) Behavioral 
Health Division to serve combat veterans and their families in the wake of the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT).  After two years of CMP operation, no formal attempts have 
been made to evaluate this mental health program.  Significant historical and contextual 
events have occurred which make evaluation of this program timely and relevant.  An 
evaluation of this program, as reported in this dissertation, was designed to enhance 
services to combat veterans and their families.   
Historical Context 
 Several historical events that have influenced the CMP’s development and 
implementation are significant to both the research problem and the methods chosen to 
address the questions introduced at the end of this chapter. 
The First Gulf War. The First Gulf War (GWI) in 1990 was an unprecedented short war 
that involved a five-month build up and 43 days of combat.  While initial casualties were 
low, major health concerns soon followed.  Soldiers in the U.S. and other countries 
experienced unexplained medical symptoms, with no identifiable cause.  The 
constellation of these symptoms, termed as the Gulf War Syndrome, emerged in the 
United States and other countries.  It became the mystery illness of GWI (McKeehan, 
Clark & Ryan, 2001).  The military’s slow response generated political, media, and 
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public pressure for more aggressive attention. To provide more current accounting of the 
health and mental health status of Soldiers, particularly those deployed to high stress 
areas, the Army developed a surveillance system to record, research, and treat Gulf War 
Syndrome (Department of Defense, 2003; McKeehan, Clark, & Ryan, 2001; 
DeploymentLINK, 2001; DOD Instruction, 1997; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2002; Post Deployment Health, 2001).  Part of this surveillance is a Post-Deployment 
Health Assessment Survey (see Appendix A), developed by Army medical researchers to 
maintain health reports of Soldiers returning from war and other deployments.  This 
health assessment includes seven mental health questions addressing degrees of combat 
stressor exposure, risk assessments, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, 
depression, and family discord.   
 New Enemy/New Army.  The threat of terrorism, as evidenced by the attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, was an unprecedented 
threat to national security.  Small, rogue combatives that were very agile, unconventional, 
and had far reaching capabilities, challenged the U.S. military.  These combatives were 
decentralized in organization, international, and did not follow conventional laws of war.  
Army transformation to effectively neutralize this unconventional rogue warfare was 
necessary.  Army Secretaries and Chief of Staffs identified the GWOT as a primary 
offensive to continue into the foreseeable future.  This new offense changed the rate, 
intensity, and duration of Soldier deployments and Soldier combat stressor exposure 
compared to recent wars, like the GWI, and other military actions, largely peacekeeping 
(Brownlee and Schoomaker, 2004; U.S. Army, 2003; White and Shinseki, 2001, 2003).  
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The increased time and intensity of Soldier experiences strained families of service 
members as well.  Addressing these issues and maintaining the force over the term of the 
GWOT was a priority for senior military leaders.   
 Army leaders realized they had to address greater security needs of the nation.  In 
addition to expanding national security into the foreseeable future, military families were 
embraced as a vital priority of Soldiers.  This philosophy is reflected in the slogan, 
“although the Army recruits Soldiers, they retain families.”  A second newly emphasized 
Army philosophy is that it is essential for Soldiers to know their families are taken care of 
so they can focus on winning wars.  The Army embraced these pro family philosophies, 
seeking to improve family supports and reduce hardships during increased absences of 
Soldiers.  This same 21st Century Army doctrine challenges Army social service 
programs to insure programs are the most effective and efficient they can be 
(Winkenwerder, 2004).  The annual Army Posture Statement mandated the evaluation 
and development of such services (U.S. Army, 2003).  The new enemy and the 
transitioning Army heightened the need for timely, tested, and effective mental health 
programs for Soldiers and their families.   
 Deaths at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  After approximately one year of combat 
in Afghanistan, an outbreak of murder/suicides involving Soldiers at Ft Bragg, North 
Carolina (Ricks, 2002) served as a wake-up call for the nation.  Four wives were 
murdered by their Soldier spouses and three of these Soldiers committed suicide.  One 
Army Soldier was murdered by his wife.  The Fort Bragg tragedies received much media 
hype in the news and on TV programs such as “60 Minutes,” and “Oprah.”  Emphasis on 
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the underlying national security issues that may exist also enhanced public and political 
pressures to address these issues immediately.   
 An epidemiological study (EPICON study) determined that deaths were not 
directly related to combat duty (U.S. Surgeon General, 2002); however, mental health 
problems and related issues were identified as contributing factors.  Fragmentation of 
services, limited confidentiality, stigma related to receipt of services, military cultural 
avoidance, and career vulnerability were identified as obstacles to seeking military 
mental health services.  The findings were used to rapidly modify the military's 
redeployment support program.  The CMP was part of the modification. 
 Another issue that emerged was combat veterans who were unprepared for 
reunification with families and life after fighting in Afghanistan.  The need to address 
these issues quickly and effectively was a top priority of the Army Surgeon General.  
Upon receipt of EPICON study recommendations, and in order to supplement services 
for Soldiers and their families, mandates were established to have new programs 
operational in a matter of months.  These planning requirements quickly enhanced mental 
health services at Army installations internationally but left limited planning resources 
for the CMP and other programs.  These contextual issues are relevant to the CMP 
development and progress.   
Army Mental Health Programs 
 In the wake of the GWOT, the U.S. Army continues to transform itself to meet 
national security needs.  This ongoing transformation has affected Army mental health 
programs.  The effects of combat on Soldiers, combat stress control, and Family 
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Advocacy services receive considerable research attention (Adler, Wright, Huffman, 
Thomas, and Castro, 2002; Campbell and Valentine, 1999; DeploymentLINK, 2001; 
DOD Instruction, 1997; FM 8-51, 1992; Hoge et al. 2004, 2004, & 2006, Office of the 
Chief of Staff, 2002; Pincus, House, Christenson, & Adler, 2001; Pincus and Nam, 1999; 
Post Deployment Health, 2001; Richie, 2002), but there has been little attention on 
mental health services for combat veterans and their families (Freidman, 2004).  Despite 
Major General William Winkenwerder’s (2004) mandate to provide treatment and 
evaluations in a timely manner, limited evaluations have occurred in the area of Army 
mental health services and programs.  The CMP, for example, has been fielded for two 
years without any formal evaluations.   
Although considered conservative estimates of the psychological effects of war, 
service members' self reports of symptoms, researchers found rates of post traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), general anxiety disorder, and depression, to be 16% to 17% of 
Soldiers and Marines returning from combat in Iraq (Hoge, Auchterlonie, and Milliken, 
2006; Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting, and Koffman, 2004; & Hoge, Toboni, 
Messer, Bell, Amoroso, and Orman, 2005). These rates are twice that of pre-deployment 
rates (Friedman, 2004).  
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
 The CMP was specifically designed to assist with post-war health.  While the 
program has operated for two years, has a $6 million annual budget, is implemented 
internationally at over 30 installations, and is providing a critical service to war veterans 
and their families; much knowledge about the program is left to speculation (Orman, 
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2003).  A formative evaluation is necessary to establish the extent to which the program 
is reaching its target population, addressing target issues, and progressing as intended 
across installations.   
 The purpose of this study is to evaluate the Army Social Work Care Manager 
Program (CMP), using a formative improvement-focused model introduced by Posavac 
and Carey (2003).  This is the initial formal study of the CMP and one of the most recent 
studies of any post deployment mental health program.   
Research Questions 
 The objectives of this study are to understand the implementation and progress of 
the CMP and provide feedback for its improvement.  After carefully considering 
stakeholders needs and desires, data accessibility, and available resources, six research 
questions were investigated.   
Program Evaluation Questions.  The first three questions pertain to formative evaluations 
investigating implementation. 
1.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) implemented as 
intended?  This is the most fundamental implementation question.  Before outcome 
evaluative methods can be applied to any program, the actual program in place must be 
investigated and verified.  Prior to that, in depth analysis is needed to determine the 
extent to which the program in place is the program originally planned.  Measures used to 
answer this question include Soldier self-assessment exit surveys from combat (Appendix 
1), Care Manager direct practice and prevention/education activities (Appendix 2) and 
Care Manager surveys (Appendix 3). 
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2.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) reaching the target 
population?  This second fundamental question is intended to assess how well the 
program targets those returning from war that report post war mental health and family 
issues.  To answer this question, Soldier-self assessment data were compared with 
characteristics of the clients served by the CMs in direct service activities. 
3.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) addressing the 
target issues identified?  This is the third fundamental question to be addressed assesses 
the program’s abilities to target problems of Soldiers negatively affected by combat 
service.  To answer this question Soldier reports of behavioral health issues were 
obtained from their self assessment exit surveys and compared to the direct and 
preventive services of the CMs.   
Site Specific Questions.  The next two questions depart from the broad or global 
evaluation of the CMP by analyzing information from three selected CMP sites, each 
using different implementation strategies.  Programs implemented by large organizations 
like the Army often implement the program in multiple locations across great distances.  
Although the CMP operates primarily in the continental United States, there are programs 
in Germany, Korea, and Italy.  Each program is different based on individual installation 
needs and local interpretations of installation leaders.  This creates an obvious 
management challenge and limits bureaucratic control, resulting in variation in the actual 
program across sites.  It is essential to program management, evaluation and development 
to capture and assess this variation.  The next two research questions serve to compare 
aspects of the implementation of the CMPs across different sites.   
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4.  How is the Care Manager Program (CMP) implemented at various 
installations?  This question sought to discover the aspects of individual program 
implementation techniques such as where Care Managers are placed within the 
installation mental health system (venues), how they are being used, and how effective 
this seems to the Care Managers.  Historical information and informal interviews with 
leader were used to determine the implementation techniques used at individual 
installations. 
5.  How do installations and implementation venues of the Care Manager 
Program (CMP) differ in their service to the target population?  Services to the target 
population provided by individual program sites (or venues) were compared.  Some 
particular concerns are the ability of smaller, more remote sites (typically serving 
primarily National Guard and Reserve units) to perform their duties compared to 
programs on large installations with higher rates of deployments and more resources.  
Mental health assessments and various reporting systems were used to compare the 
individual sites. 
Care Manager (CM) Perceptions.  The final research question seeks to discover the 
perceptions and feedback of the CMs currently working in the field.   
6.  What are the perceptions and attitudes of Care Managers?  The question 
was answered through semi-structured qualitative analyses with focus groups of CMs and 





Value of the Study 
This formative evaluation of the CMP expands current literature in several ways.  
First, this study contributes to community mental health services management by 
investigating a mental health program implemented and managed on a national level.  
Delivering adequate and sustained mental health services to large communities is a 
challenge.  This study reveals the effects of management choices and the ability of 
programs to meet goals and objectives across multiple sites at national levels.   
It also serves the U.S. Army Medical Department (AMEDD) Behavioral Health 
Division as well as the profession of social work through the timely evaluation of the 
social services provided to combat veterans and their families.  It is important that 
managers and providers understand the impact and utility of the programs they develop.  
This is one of the first formative implementation/monitoring studies to evaluative 
services, provider perceptions, clients served, and needs addressed by programs focused 
on post-combat needs of Soldiers. It sets the stage for future summative evaluations and 
establishes literature for the development of timely and fine-tuned services to combat 
veterans and their families.  Finally, this study serves as a formative evaluation of the 
ability of a large-scale internationally implemented behavioral health program to attain 






 This chapter reviews case management theory and mental health services 
utilization by clientele relevant to the CMP.  The mental health case management 
treatment approach is a unique type of mental health services delivery that specializes in 
coordination and integration of services.  Ideals, assumptions, definitions and models of 
case management are introduced and a review of case management outcome studies is 
provided.   
Case Management Theory 
Introduction to Case Management.  Gibelman (2004) describes case management as an 
approach to outpatient service provision that controls costs and produces efficiency in the 
delivery of mental health services.  Case management is applied to many fields and yields 
its best returns in the coordination and integration of multiple service providers to meet 
the needs of clients (Davies, 2000; Gibelman, 2004; Miley, Omelia & DuBois, 2004; 
MacEachron, Pensky, and Hawes, 1986).  Case management is a common approach in 
child welfare, developmental disability services, services for those with chronic mental 
illness, Soldiers redeploying from war, and just recently in the provision of services to 
Soldiers and families affected by the GWOT (Gibelman, 2004; Orman, 2003a & b; Rossi, 
1998).   
Case management is not unique to social work services.  Case management is a 
health care delivery approach used in hospitals, employed in managed care, and is used 
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by other professions, but is most frequently used in social work and nursing (Barker, 
1987; Calhoun & Casey, 2002; Gibelman, 2004; MacEachron, Pensky, & Hawes, 1986).  
MacEachron, Penskey, and Hawes (1986) studied case management services provided to 
persons with developmental disorders.  They found no superiority of one profession over 
others in the provision of case management.  Case management is essential in seeing that 
clients with complex problems get the multiple services they need.  Soldiers participating 
in war often experience complex problems best treated using a case management 
approach.  These problems include multiple physical problems, post-combat emotional 
problems and increased vulnerability for psychosocial problems (Rossi, 1998; Wessely, 
2004).  Case management programs were used during WWII to manage complex 
treatment cases of the war (Rossi, 1998).  These complex treatment cases included 
multiple health problems, both physical and psychological.  The Army care manager 
program, much like the WWII case management programs identified by Rossi (1998) 
was implemented during the GWOT to manage the unique and complex issues common 
to service members serving in times of war.    
Universal Ideals of Case Management Theory.  As discussed previously, case 
management has existed since the 1930s.  Universal ideals and protocols of case 
management often times are secondary to establishing the delivery of complex systems of 
case management to specific and diverse populations.  These populations range from 
children to the frail elderly, from war veterans to those made vulnerable through disease 
or accident (HIV/AIDs populations or victim of traumatic brain injury).  Regardless of 
the specific population served or the profession providing the case management services, 
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this method of health and mental health delivery shares have basic theories, assumptions, 
definitions, and models. 
Assumptions and definitions of case management.  The basic assumption of case 
management is that it is an effective system of social service delivery for clients, clients' 
families, communities and agencies (Solomon, 1992).  It is a method of managing 
available services that are disperse and, at times, fragmented and complicated for clients 
to understand or negotiate (Boreland, McRae, & Lycan, 1989; Chamberlain & Rapp, 
1991; Davies, 2000; Rossi, 2003; Orman, 2003a & b; U.S. Army Surgeon General, 2002; 
Ziguras & Stuart, 2000).   Rossi (2003) stresses that case management should be an 
independent function of service provision that does not blur the roles of specific service 
providers with the roles of managing the multiple services available.  When roles are 
combined, Rossi argues, one of the services will take second stage, leaving the client to 
suffer.  Alternatively, Garvin and Seabury (1984) identify the case manager as the 
professional in the service network that is responsible for coordinating activities.  They 
oversee the planning of the treatment and coordinate various activities and actions within 
the complex and diverse social service network.  Without case management, interagency 
conflicts, misunderstandings, and lack of coordination and information results in mixed 
messages, and at times, mixed expectations sent to the consumer.  Also, clients may fall 
through the cracks or not get all of the services they need.  It is assumed that the 
management of complex cases will improve services, their usage, and the timeliness of 
such services.   
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There are several definitions of case management. Solomon (1992) basically and 
succinctly describes the coordinated activities of case management as a strategy “on 
behalf of clients to obtain the services they need, when they need them and for as long as 
they need these services” (p. 164).  Barker, provides a more elaborate definition in The 
Social Work Dictionary defining case management as: 
A procedure to coordinate all the helping activities on behalf of a client or 
group of clients.  The procedure makes it possible for many workers in the 
agency, or different agencies, to coordinate their efforts to serve a given 
client through professional teamwork, thus expanding the range of needed 
services offered.  Case management may involve monitoring the progress 
of a client whose needs require the services of many different 
professionals, agencies, healthcare facilities, and human service programs.  
It typically involves case findings, comprehensive multidimensional 
assessment and frequent reassessment….Social workers and nurses are the 
professional groups most often called upon to fulfill this function.  Case 
management is seen as an increasingly important way of limiting problems 
arising from fragmentation of services, staff turnover, and inadequate 
coordination between providers. (Barker, 1987, p. 20) 
A 1992 National Association of Social Workers work group acknowledges that case 
management's multiple applications within social work and multiple professions make 
case management difficult to describe.  The social work specific NASW definition of 
case management is: 
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Social work case management is a method of providing services whereby 
a professional social worker assesses the needs of the client and the 
client’s family, when appropriate, and arranges, coordinates, monitors, 
evaluates, and advocates for a package of multiple services to meet the 
specific client’s complex needs. A professional social worker is the 
primary provider of social work case management. Distinct from other 
forms of case management, social work case management addresses both 
the individual client’s biopsychosocial status as well as the state of the 
social system in which case management operates. Social work case 
management is both micro and macro in nature: intervention occurs at 
both the client and system levels. It requires the social worker to develop 
and maintain a therapeutic relationship with the client, which may include 
linking the client with systems that provide him or her with needed 
services, resources, and opportunities. Services provided under the rubric 
of social work case management practice may be located in a single 
agency or may be spread across numerous agencies or organizations. 
(NASW, 1992) 
Tasks/Responsibilities of Case Management.  Effective case management requires 
a constellation of services.  The case manager is responsible for many tasks that are 
identified differently by several authors, yet have a similar theme (Davies, 2000; 
Gambrill, 1983 & 1997; Gibelman, 1995 & 2004; NASW, 1992).  Gambrill (1997) 
describes the roles and responsibilities of the case manager as screening, assessing, 
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service plan development, linking, monitoring and evaluating all services provided in a 
manner that fosters client success and independence.  The case manager also acts in the 
roles of broker, advocate, and direct service provider (Gibelman, 1995).  Although there 
is no universally accepted definition of case management, nor one model of service 
delivery, the definitions, roles, tasks and responsibilities establish the nature of case 
management practice which guide its use and it service to clients. These universal 
standards allow major models of case management to be effective and within professional 
principles of good practice. 
Major Models of Case Management.  Models of case management are developed 
to meet the needs of clients with specific issues, within communities with unique 
resources, by agencies with individual characteristics.  Reviewing all or most models of 
case management is not within the scope of this paper, however case management 
typically falls under four major models of case management.  Chamberlain and Rapp 
(1991) and Vanderplasschen et al. (2004) describe these four major social work case 
management models as (1) generalist/broker, (2) clinical/ rehabilitation, (3) strengths, and 
(4) intensive/assertive community treatment.     
Generalist/broker model of case management.  This basic model of case 
management is a brief model in which case managers carry larger caseloads and clients 
have less of a need for direct services.  Typically there is little to no active advocacy with 
this model but assessment and referrals/linking is crucial. Typical activities of the 
generalist/broker model are assessment, planning, linking, coordinating, protecting those 
at risk, and maintenance with periodic follow-up services (Vanderplasschen et al., 2004).  
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This model focuses on addressing deficits in client systems and typically places much 
more emphasis on the assessment conducted by the case manager rather than client self-
determination (Chamberlain & Rapp, 1991; Vanderplasschen et al., 2004).   
Clinical/rehabilitation model of case management.  Clinical or rehabilitation case 
management combines features of the generalist model with clinical activities 
(Vanderplasschen et al., 2004).  This model emphasizes a formal service system, client 
self-determination (Chamberlain & Rapp, 1991), and empirically driven approaches to 
care (Freeman & Harris, 1993).  This model integrates psychotherapy, psychoeducation, 
and intensive individual caregiving for clients in need of more intensive services than 
general case management. 
Strengths model of case management.  This model represents a paradigm shift 
from the dominant mental health services system that was criticized for being deficit 
driven and contributing to oppression.  The strengths model compensates for a deficit 
driven health system believed to focus on individual, family, and community pathology 
(Rapp, 1998). This model identifies naturally occurring community, family, and 
individual resources with a focus on client self-determination (Chamberlain & Rapp, 
1991).  It follows an interpretive theory base, using narratives, artistic synthesis, and 
interpretations.  There is a subjective/ collaborative relationship between the provider and 
client rather than a hierarchical/authority based relationship in this model (Freeman & 
Harris, 1993).  In this model clients are encouraged to identify their own strengths and 
take control of the search for resources and direction of treatment (Vanderplasschen et 
al., 2004).    
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Intensive/assertive community treatment model of case management.  As implied 
in the name, this type of case management provides the most comprehensive package of 
services directly to the client (Chamberlain & Rapp, 1991; Vanderplasschen et al., 2004).  
The case management team provides many services directly to clients.  These intense 
services require lower case loads, higher individual client contacts, and an emphasis on 
problem identification and treatment.  Client self-determination takes a lesser role in 
comparison to other models while case manager decisions are more central (Chamberlain 
& Rapp, 1991).   
Outcome Studies for General Case Management.  There is a need for effective brokerage 
and monitoring of services within the complex mental health delivery system in out 
nation.  Without such service management clients have difficulties accessing appropriate 
services at critical times to reduce costs and improve mental health conditions. 
Chamberlain & Rapp (1991) acknowledged the increased interest in case management 
services to provide these services but identified a paucity of rigorous design in outcome 
research.  Due to the broad application of case management and diversity in programs 
and outcome measures, however, conclusive evidence of outcomes in case management 
are still being pursued and have proven to be elusive (Chamberlain & Rapp, 1991; 
Franklin, Solovitz, Mason, Clemons, & Miller, 1987; McRae, Higgins, Lucan, & 
Sherman, 1990; Patterson et al., 1999; Roberts-DeGennaro, 1993; Solomon, 1992; 
Ziguras & Stuart, 2000).  Proper use of general case management can reduce 
inappropriate use of inpatient care and improve the quality of life for clients in the 
community.  Even though these facts are well established and general case management 
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is widely used, evidence of its effectiveness or cost efficiency is still widely pursued 
(Franklin et al., 1987).   
General case management outcomes have been scarcely studied in community 
mental health settings and where it has been studied, measures and rigor vary greatly.  
Franklin et al. (1987) studied general case management provided to those in need of long 
term mental health services.  They discovered that those receiving general case 
management were exposed to more services, had more hospital admissions and cost more 
to maintain than those who received any services but case management.   
After a decade of case management, Chamberlain & Rapp (1991) highlighted the 
inability of persons with severe mental illness to access mental health services and case 
management services developed to meet this service access need.  This problem was also 
noted with Soldiers and their families within the military mental healthcare system (U.S. 
Army Surgeon General, 2002).  In their 1991 study of such service programs, 
Chamberlain and Rapp discovered that outcome studies of general case management 
were scarce and of limited quality and generalizability.  They reported little to no 
conformity in the studies and that outcome measures varied greatly as well.  Of two 
studies reviewed, one used client functioning, quality of life and symptoms as measures, 
while a second study investigated client functioning, recidivism, hospital days, and 
quality of life.  Chamberlain and Rapp's study revealed that there are shortcomings in 
identifying what exactly is being evaluated in this method of case management and 
generalizability and comparability can be challenging (1991). 
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Ziguras and Stuart (2000) conducted a meta-analysis examining 20 years of case 
management studies from 1980 and 1998.  Forty-four controlled studies were analyzed.  
They reported small to moderate improvements in services when case management was 
used compared to usual treatment in areas of family burden, family satisfaction with 
services, total number of days hospitalized, and cost of care.  This meta-analysis 
demonstrated an ability of general case management services to decrease the length of 
admissions and overall hospitalization days, reduce symptoms, increase clients’ use of 
services, and increase client services.  The total number of admissions and the proportion 
of clients hospitalized increased with general case management.  Implications were that 
with case management service availability increased while symptoms decreased and 
conditions improved (Ziguras & Stuart, 2000).    
General models of case management have produced mixed and modest outcomes 
with significant design limitations.  Regardless of limited outcome findings, case 
management remains a mental health service delivery option that has the potential to 
enhance access to services, brokerage, linkage, and advocacy for clients.  After the 
findings of restricted service use on the part of Soldiers and their families due to 
stigmatization, fears of reprisals, doubts about confidentiality, and fragmentation of 
services, the Army implemented a generalist case management program that has been in 
place for over two years.  The program has a decentralized application and broad service 
area, which has resulted in a broad, yet uninvestigated, application worldwide and 
throughout the spectrum of military mental healthcare agencies.  Evaluation is necessary 
to gain insight into the extent to which the program in place is what was intended and to 
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what extent it serves the target population and their target issues.  A review of mental 
health program evaluation supports the design of this program implementation evaluation 
for this study. 
Army Care Manager Program 
History and Theory of the Care Manager Program (CMP).  Soldiers participating in war 
often experience complex problems that may be best treated by case management (Rossi, 
1998; Wessely, 2004).  The Army care manager program, much like the case manager 
programs Rossi (1998) described treating service members during World War II, was 
implemented during the GWOT to manage the unique and complex issues common to 
service members serving in times of war.  Social work services are vital to the 
reunification of Soldiers to their families and post war life.  The decisions behind the 
CMP and its underlying theory are unique and affect the services provided and therefore 
the clients and loved ones served.  The CMP history is outlined below as a backdrop to 
the program under study. 
 History of the Care Manager Program.  In response to the attacks on the United 
States World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001, the Army Chief of Staff, General 
Shinseki, foresaw the need for enhanced support services, to include mental health 
services, for Soldiers and their families and wanted these services evaluated.  With 
increased deployments and the intense activities of war reaching into the unforeseeable 
future, health, mental health, and family problems were predicted to be significant and 
inevitable consequences for service members and their families.  General Shinseki 
directed Army leaders to posture the force to better serve the needs of Soldiers and 
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families.  Challenges were imposed for support services to better prepare Soldiers and 
families for the activities and stressors of war and separation (White & Shinseki, 2001).  
General Shinseki’s predictions of inadequate support services in the wake of the 
increased military operations and family system strain were realized during a rash of 
homicide/homicide-suicides at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in the summer of 2002 after a 
year of deployments to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  The Army 
EPICON study was initiated to investigate these deaths.  The study revealed flawed 
mental health service delivery systems as contributing factors to limited mental health 
service use, which may have prevented the deaths (U.S. Army Surgeon General, 2002).  
A re-engineered Deployment Cycle Support Program (DCSP) was designed to “assist 
Army personnel as they return to their communities, reunite with families and loved ones, 
and re-establish the readiness of the force” (Army Public Affairs, 2003, p. 1).   Analysts 
acknowledged that high rates of psychosocial distress and medically unexplained post-
war symptoms had taken a toll on Soldiers and their families.  They also recognized that 
with advanced technologies, families become “virtually deployed” with service members 
and experienced heighten involvement and stress from battle reports.  One in seven Gulf 
War I (GWI) Soldiers sought war-related health care demonstrating the strains of war on 
participants.  With preventive intervention, however, it was acknowledged that peers and 
leaders could identify and mitigate war symptoms and refer Soldiers for early preventive 
screening and treatment.  Lastly, it was recognized that a concerted effort to strategically 
address the military cultural stigma related to receiving mental health care may diminish 
reluctance to seek treatment (Department of Defense DCS Initiative, 2005).  The DCSP's 
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mission of the was to “successfully reintegrate redeploying Soldiers into their home 
station” (Department of Defense DCS Initiative, 2005, p 24), and its purpose was “to 
address, mitigate and prevent domestic violence and serve as a mitigator for GW I “type” 
war syndromes typically referred to as medically unexplained symptoms (MUS)” 
(Department of Defense DCS Initiative, 2005, p. 2).   
The DCSP is modeled on a “successful aviation safety program that emphasizes 
the principle of redundancy of risk management efforts to minimize unnecessary and 
tragic outcomes” (Department of Defense CMP, 2003, p. 1).  This model acknowledges 
that aviation operations involve “inherently higher risk (high probability of accidents and 
more severe consequences) than most ground operations” (Army Regulation 385-95, 
1999, p. 9).  To prevent catastrophic risk, organizational redundancy through interlocking 
and repetitive safety evaluations by separate entities is made routine.  This redundancy, 
implemented in aviation approximately 30 years ago, reduces human error in safety 
management, thus reducing catastrophic mistakes (Aviation Safety, 2006).  This 
elaborate safety model was incorporated in healthcare practices (emergency rooms, 
intensive care units, surgical wards, etc) to reduce human error and improve services and 
communication (Gaba, 2000; Rutherford, 2003; Wilf-Miron, Lewenhoff, Benyamini, & 
Aviram, 2003).  The DCSP incorporates this model through implementation of several 
overlapping safety, screening, education, and direct service programs to improve risk 
identification and outreach services to combat veterans and their families.  The Army 
CMP is one of the several components of the DCSP providing vital services in the 
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redundancy of risk management checks in military health care and behavioral health 
settings.   
The Army CMP, as a part of the DCSP, is in place to enhance services to Soldiers 
and their families in the wake of the GWOT.  The Army CMP “provides services 
primarily to high-risk Soldiers and family members in accordance with Department of 
Defense Post Deployment Health-Clinical Guidelines...” including the “evaluation for 
medical discharge, treatment of Soldiers wounded in action and their families and family 
members of Soldiers KIA, and deployment related medically unexplained symptoms” 
(Mabe, 2005, p. 1).  The Chief Army Behavioral Health advisor to the Army Surgeon 
General identified the CMP as “critical to the success and safe redeployment of Soldiers” 
(Orman, 2003, p 1).  Care Managers maintain a generalist case management approach by 
providing such services as case management, care advocacy, referral and education, 
behavioral health screening, assessment and specialty referrals for long-term care (Army 
Public Affairs, 2003).  Using this model a case manager can serve a large caseload by 
decreasing the number of counseling sessions, identifying appropriate agency referrals, 
and maintaining the client in the behavioral health treatment network through follow-up, 
linkages, supports, and referrals.  To maintain the quality of this program, Colonel Orman 
advises that the CMP remain well trained, supported, monitored, and evaluated for 
implementation effectiveness and sustainment (Orman, 2003a). 
 Army Care Management vs. Case Manager.  The Army CMP title may be 
somewhat confusing; however, history, politics and context can shed light on this 
confusion.  The CMP uses the “care manager” rather than “case manager” title which 
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may be theoretically and professionally misleading.  This occurs because care 
management, as defined by Davies in the 2000 Encyclopedia of Social Work is “the 
process of identifying and organizing more individualized and appropriate packages of 
care to vulnerable individuals requiring long-term care, usually in their own homes” 
(2000, p. 38).  In essence, case management is seen as pivotal in the provision of long-
term care which is necessary for persons with chronic mental illness, developmental 
disabilities, or geriatric populations.  These populations have substantial limitations in 
levels of functioning which makes closer monitoring essential and long-term care the 
norm. 
 The care management level of care, by definition, does not correspond to the level 
of functioning of most Soldiers returning from war and their families.  Care management 
focuses on intensive needs of extremely vulnerable populations.  The title does not 
accurately represent the mission of the care manager; defined by the current program 
manager as “caring for Soldiers and their families with post deployment issues 
throughout the deployment cycle” (LTC retired Maryann Mabe, personal communication, 
November 11, 2005).  Ms. Mabe further clarified that the care manager title does not 
represent the roles of their workers.  She described the title as a compromise among the 
various health care providers in Army installations.  The title of case manager has long 
been assigned to hospital nurses that manage complex cases in their health care settings.  
Since many mental health services are provided in Army hospitals and many, if not most, 
CMP clients would use multiple hospital services, it was prudent to select a separate and 
distinct title for the new Army social work positions.  (LTC retired Maryann Mabe, 
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personal communication, November 11, 2005).   Ms. Mabe described the Army social 
work care managers as case managers, but indicated the title of “care manager” was 
adopted to avoid confusion for clients navigating the Army health care system 
particularly when working with nurse case managers. 
Orman (2003a) further elaborated the distinction of the Army CMP from typical 
mental health case management.  Serving as the Behavioral Health consultant to the 
Army Surgeon General, Colonel Orman emphasized that the care managers would not be 
limited to the coordination and delivery of mental health services alone.  Rather, CMs 
would assist those affected by the GWOT with any biopsychosocial condition(s) they 
face in returning from, or preparing for, combat.  This would assist in rapidly identifying 
and providing services for the numerous conditions experienced after war duties, 
including the constellation of medically unexplained symptoms that are historically noted 
after war time duties and discovered at alarming rates after the First Gulf War and 
described in the introduction of this study (Hang, Natelson, Mahan, Lee, & Murphy, 
2003; Hyams, Wignall, & Roswell, 1996; Kelsall, Forbes, Glass, MeKenzie, Ikin, 
Abramson, Blizzard, Ittak, 2004; Wessely, 2004).   
Army Behavioral Health leaders determined that the title of care manager would 
separate the social workers from the nursing positions, thus reducing confusion for 
consumers, and aptly distancing consumers from the often avoided area of mental health 
services by avoiding the title of case manager.  Thus the title of Army Care Manager 
(CM) refers to broad direct and indirect services to meet the biopsychosocial needs of 
Soldiers and families affected by the GWOT.  
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 Army Care Manager Program Model.  The Army Care Manager Program model 
is similar to models described by Freeman and Harris (1993).  These models do not 
explicitly identify their foundation and historical features, but rather this information is 
inferred through the analysis of purpose, characteristics, and dynamics of the models 
themselves.  The Army CMP has unique and significant history and features.  This 
section describes elements of the Army CMP and how they relate to case management 
theory.   
After the study of Soldier homicide/suicide activity at a major Army base with 
high rates of combat deployments, there was a rapid push to “do something” to improve 
services and prevent such catastrophes within the Army.  One result of this push was the 
CMP.  It was developed out of general guidelines of case management and implemented 
under a decentralized management approach, allowing installation behavioral health 
commanders to place CMs within the healthcare system where they were most needed.  
The program was implemented under a decentralized “mutual adaptation” approach that 
allowed local installations to develop the program as needed while maintaining the 
overall program mission to assist combat veterans and their families with problems 
related to the cycle of deployments and general goals.   
Decentralized approaches empower local leaders to implement programs to meet 
the unique needs of their local installations.  These approaches also have the strength of 
building morale by delegating control to the local levels (Scheirer, 1981).  Furthermore, 
programs implemented across several locations and large distances are often times done 
so under a “mutual adaptation” approach.  This approach to program implementation 
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limits centralized controls while allowing local installations to build the program as 
necessary with limited guidance and oversight.  It is imperative under this philosophy to 
evaluate programs to establish the extent to which the program is operating as intended at 
various sites and to develop sites and build the overall program (Greenwich, 2002).   
The result of the decentralized mutual adaptation program implementation 
method of the CMP is the diverse, yet not fully understood, application of CMs at sites 
internationally.  Army CMs are found in major hospitals, social work services, behavioral 
health, medical hold units, soldier readiness sites, and family advocacy program.  Yet, 
after two years of implementation, it is not known exactly what the care managers do in 
specific and how this work differs across installations and work sites.  This study 
examines the implementation of the CMP by discovering where CMs are placed, what 
activities they are conducting, how they are performing at this point, and to what extent 
they are serving the target population and its target issues.  This study also serves as an 
implementation study which verifies the program actually in place compared to the 
program originally planned.   
Target Population Service Utilization 
 A U.S. national study in 2003 to 2005 reported that almost 28 million adults (13% 
of the adult population) received behavioral health services in the past year (Office of 
Applied Science, 2006).  In the U.S. Army, a Health Status evaluation reported that 
psychiatric conditions were the second highest reason for receiving healthcare, 
accounting for 5% of healthcare services and second to joint disorders.  Behavioral health 
services were the most frequent outpatient visit (8%) and the most frequent reason for 
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hospitalization (6%) (US Outcomes Research, 2003).  The military population is 
particularly vulnerable to behavioral health conditions in recent years due to heightened 
combat exposure.  It is projected that over 2 million military personnel will have 
participated in the GWOT (Insurance Information Institute, 2006).  U.S. Military studies 
reveal high rates of behavioral health conditions. As many as 35% of service members 
sought behavioral health services in the first year after deployment to operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006).  Often times, behavioral health 
conditions led to separation from service (Hoge et al., 2002).  A U.S. Surgeon General 
report concluded that minority populations are underserved in behavioral health services 
(Padgett et al., 1994).  It is also necessary to understand cultural and gender influences in 
behavioral health service utilization to maintain the best programs and services and to 
provide cultural and gender competent care.   
 In general, mental health conditions are one of the greatest health threats in the 
US military.  They were the leading cause of discharge for men and second leading cause 
for women.  Mental health conditions accounted for 23% of all inpatient hospital bed 
days and 13% of all hospitalizations.  Of those hospitalized for mental health conditions, 
47% were discharged from the service within six months compared to 12% discharge rate 
for any of the other 15 health diagnostic conditions represented in the Army healthcare 
reporting system.  The mental health of service members is a major concern for our 
nation (Hoge et al., 2002).  This concern is exacerbated in wartime. 
 However, Hoge, Auchterlonie, and Milliken, (2006) reported that 19% of all 
military members return from duty in Iraq self reported a mental health problem and that 
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35% used mental health services within one year of returning from the deployment.  In 
comparison to this rate, the general deploying military population reports approximately 
9% of behavioral health service utilization within the first year after redeployment.   
After controlling for age, gender, and duration of deployments the difference in service 
utilization between Iraq war veterans and the general deploying population remained 
significant (Hoge et al., 2002).  The trend of increased behavioral health service 
utilization for combat veterans was similar with reserve forces.  As many as 40% of 
redeploying Nation Guard and Reserve service members report mental health problems 
(Darwin & Reich, 2006).  
 Understanding the service utilization of sub-populations of clientele enhances 
services.  Of the active-duty force, 41% are minority and 59% are White (also referred to 
as non-Hispanic White) (US Outcomes Research, 2003).  Access and utilization of 
behavioral health services by ethnicity differs.  Traditionally, national studies have 
reported low outpatient service utilization by Latinos and African Americans (Office of 
Applied Sciences, 2006; Ojeda & McGuire; 2006, Padgett et al., 1994).  In several of 
these national studies, disparities remained significant even when controlling for gender.  
In a national study of depressed clients, Ojeda and McGuire (2006) found there was no 
difference in service utilization between Latino males and White males, but this may be 
due to a small Latino male sample.  In a national insured population, Padgett et al. (1994) 
reported that African Americans and Latinos used fewer services than Whites.  Even 
when socioeconomic factors were controlled, minority disadvantage in service utilization 
persisted with African Americans at all ages, and young Latinos also had lower odds of 
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service utilization (Office of Applied Sciences, 2006).  However, this study revealed that 
behavioral health service utilization did increase from 1989 to 1999 and the increase was 
highest among African Americans.  This is a welcome trend because historically Blacks 
have been found to have lower behavioral health service utilization than Hispanics and 
Whites (Office of Applied Sciences, 2006).  In general, national studies have reported 
that those receiving outpatient services were more educated and of higher socioeconomic 
while those hospitalized had lower socioeconomic standing regardless of ethnicity.   
 In summary, there are ethnic and socioeconomic barriers to outpatient behavioral 
health services.  These barriers may in fact become predisposing factors to inpatient care.  
This trend in evident in the military as well.  Military inpatient behavioral health service 
increased the likelihood of discharge by 35% compared to those hospitalized for any 
other disease (Hoge et. al, 2002).  It is important to understand and address the issues 
related to service utilization and ethnicity in research, program evaluation and 
development and practice.   
 Although predominantly male, the US Army is a very diverse organization with 
increasing numbers of women serving in a predominantly male culture (Lindstrom et al., 
2006).  It is essential to understand gender issues when addressing behavioral health in 
the Army and when developing and evaluating programs that serve Soldiers.  The active-
duty force consists of 85% men and 15% women and the deployed force is 89% and 
11%, respectively.  Psychiatric services received by the active duty force were the most 
frequent outpatient health service, with 11% of women and 7% of men diagnosed with a 
mental disorder (US Outcomes Research, 2003).  In both national and Army specific 
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studies, there were no differences in minority men and minority women's service 
utilization, however, white women had a higher rate of service utilization than white 
males.  In a national study of service utilization in 2000–2001 and 2003-3005, this trend 
was prominent; women were more likely to use services than men by as much as 2 to 3 
(Office of Applied Sciences, 2002 & 2006).  This trend was similar in the Army 
population.  The importance of the issue is enhanced by the fact that male Soldiers are 
more likely to be exposed to trauma, yet less likely to receive services.  One study on 
gender of service members and deployments revealed that women reported more 
psychological distress due to interpersonal stressors while men reported more mission-
related stressors (Vogt, Pless, King & King, 2005). 
 This gender predisposition toward help-seeking interacts with ethnic factors with 
regard to depression, since in a study of depressed persons, White women were almost 
twice as likely as Latino and African American women to use such services (Ojeda & 
McGuire, 2006).  A similar trend was found in service utilization in the military.  In a 
sample of Gulf War I veterans, White women were also more likely to seek behavioral 
heath services than African American women (Vogt, Pless, King, & King, 2005).  These 
findings are consistent with the findings that African Americans are underserved in 
behavioral health settings.  It also emphasized that women's tendency to seek treatment 
more frequently than men did not compensate for the African American underutilization 
of services.  Issues of both racial and gender marginalization were theorized as contribute 
to the under representation of African American women in the area of mental health 
services (Vogt, Pless, King, King, 2005). As in the overall population, women are more 
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likely than men to seek and receive behavioral health treatment but this service utilization 
decreases for African American women. Men are more exposed to trauma, yet less likely 
to seek assistance.  When developing future programs and evaluating current ones, it is 
important to understand the impact of gender on help seeking behavior and service 
utilization.   
 The CMP is a unique social work case management program that serves clients in 
a large complex organization of over 500,000 members.  Evaluating this program is 
essential to ensure that clients are being served and that their conditions are being 
addressed.  The study focuses on the extent to which this new CMP is implemented as 
intended, reaches it target population, and addresses target problems as identified in a 
sample of redeploying Soldiers.  This study also reveals characteristics of gender, 
ethnicity, and rank of combat veterans and their reported combat exposure and behavioral 
health symptoms.  Understanding these data when evaluating programs allows 
researchers and service providers to develop services tailored to better serve these 
subpopulations.  The following chapter describes the methodology for a formative 





 The purpose of this study is to provide a program evaluation of the newly 
implemented Army Care Manager Program (CMP).  After an analysis of the program 
background, concerns of stakeholders, and program evaluation protocol, the appropriate 
program evaluation methodology appeared to be a formative process evaluations with an 
improvement focus integrating both quantitative and qualitative data sources in a 
triangulated methodology.  This chapter outlines the methodology of the study.  It is 
organized into three sections: research questions, methodology, and procedures. 
Research Questions  
 
Research Questions:  The goal of this study was to conduct a formative process/progress 
evaluation of the newly developed and implemented Army Social Work Care Manager 
Program (CMP). The research questions investigated were as follows: 
  1.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) implemented as intended?  
This is the most fundamental and overarching question.  The question addressed the 
CMP’ ability to meet program goals and objectives outlined and combined all data 
sources and findings from the other research questions.   
  2.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) reaching the target 
population?  This question addressed the extent to which CMs direct clinical services and 
prevention activities reached those in need of services as determined by the Soldier Post-
Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA).  Two data sources were used to evaluate this. 
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The PDHA was used to identify target population characteristics and the U.S. Military 
electronic patient administration systems and biostatistics activity reporting (PASBA) 
was used to assess direct clinical services provided by CMs to Soldiers.  
  3.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) addressing identified 
target problems?  This question addresses the CMP’s ability to address issues of the 
target population.  Three data sources were used to address this question, the PDHA, 
PASBA, and the CM Prevention and Outreach Monitoring Sheet. 
4.  How is the Care Manager Program (CMP) implemented at various 
installations?  This question addresses the different ways in which local behavioral health 
leaders chose to implement the CMP one their installations.  CM focus group, supervisor 
interviews and pre-study meetings with past and present administrators were used to 
assess these implementation trends across program sites. 
5.  How do installations and implementation venues of the Care Manager Program 
differ in their ability to serve the target population?  This question addresses the ability of 
individual sites to reach the target population and their target issues.  Data used in 
questions 3 were compared across installations.  This data was the PDHA, PASBA, and 
the CM Prevention and Outreach Monitoring Sheet. 
6. What are the perceptions and attitudes of the CMP Care Managers toward the 
CMP?  CM focus groups and supervisor semi-structured interviews were conducted at 
selected sites to gather in-depth qualitative data about the perceptions, opinions, and 





Site Selection.  The CMP is managed by the Army Medical Department Headquarters 
(AMEDD) Behavioral Health Division at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.  All policies, 
instructions, coordination, and resources are managed through this central location.  
There are 30 locations where CMs are located throughout the U.S. Army worldwide.  
Table 4.1 lists the locations of CMPs worldwide, indicating the number of CMs at each 
location in parentheses.   
Table 3.1 Care Manager Program Sites Worldwide (Care Manager number per site) 
 
Active Duty           Reserve/National Guard Overseas        Medical Centers 
Fort Hood (6)  Fort Polk (2)   Germany (4)         Walter Reed (6) 
Fort Bragg (5)  Fort Leonardwood (2)   Italy (1)         Fort Gordon (2) 
Fort Drum (2)  Fort Bliss (2)   Korea (3)      BrookMEDCEN(5) 
Fort Carson (4)  Fort Sill (2)   Hawaii (1) 
Fort Riley (3)  Camp Atterberry (1) 
Fort Campbell (4)  Fort Knox (2) 
Fort Stewart (4)  Fort Eustis (1) 
Fort Benning (4)  Fort McCoy (1) 
Fort Lewis (5)  Fort Dix (1) 
 
Site selection for this study was conducted through program implementation data 
provided by program administrators at Behavioral Health Division at Fort Sam Houston, 
TX and preliminary study data.  These data revealed that programs were implemented 
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under three different strategies.  These implementation strategies were independent 
program, augmentation force, and sole provider.  Three sites, one under each 
implementation strategy, were selected for this study.  The independent program site was 
located at the largest of the installations studied, housed the largest CMP and major 
combat units, and contained a large Army medical center that treated war veterans with 
major combat injuries.  The augmentation force program was at a major active duty 
installation as well.  It housed large numbers of combat troops and also housed a large 
number of training and support Soldiers for a large Army training mission for infantry 
and Airborne Soldiers in the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).  The last site 
selected was the sole provider site that was a support installation which housed Soldiers 
that have missions to provide support to the combat forces.  This installation had the 
primary movement mission to deploy National Guard and Reserve Units in a several state 
region of the United States.  Each site selected was a strong example of its CMP 
implementation strategy and was feasible for this study by proximity to the researcher 
and access to CMs and their supervisors. 
Data Sources.  This study uses a triangulation methodology incorporating multiple data 
sources and both qualitative and quantitative research methods to answer the six research 
questions of this study.  The data sources include meetings with program planners and 
program documents, a Soldier post-deployment self assessment of combat stressor 
exposure and behavioral health issues (PDHA), CM direct clinic services Army Medical 
Department electronic database (PASBA), A Care Manager Outreach and Prevention 
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Monitoring Sheet (IMS), CM focus Groups, and CMP supervisors interviews.  These data 
sources are outlined below with the research question(s) that the data sources support.   
Program Planner Interviews and Documents.  Program planners and 
administrators for the CMP at the Army Department of Behavioral Health provided 
background data about the development and early progress of the CMP.  Through these 
interviews, documents pertaining to program mission, goals, and objectives were 
discussed and program documents substantiating these data were made available.   The 
interviews and the data they provided were relevant for historical information outlined 
during the literature review of this dissertation and were the program information used to 
answer the first research question of this study.  
 The Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA).  All Soldiers participating in 
the GWOT and returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) and some other designated peacekeeping deployment locations (Bosnia 
and Kosovo) participate in a population-based survey of reported health concerns (Post-
Deployment Health Assessment [PDHA], Appendix 2).  This confidential Soldier self 
report health assessment instrument is maintained in the Electronic Defense Medical 
Surveillance System (DMSS) and provides demographic data and self-reported combat 
stressor exposure and symptoms for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, 
risk assessment issues, and other mental health and relationship issues. A sample of 
Soldiers completing this assessment during the 12-month period prior to monitoring the 
activities of the CMP was assessed for this study.  These data revealed the target 
 
 38
population that the CMP is designed to reach as well as the rates of the target issues.   
The data applies to research questions 1, 2, 3, and 5. 
The instrument incorporated three questions designed to indicate a level of 
exposure to combat stressors or combat trauma situations for Soldiers.  These questions 
provided an indication of the level of trauma experienced by Soldiers in combat and 
recorded this exposure by gender, rank and ethnicity.  The next set of PDHA items 
measured self-reported symptoms of depression, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and risk behaviors. The last question measures help seeking behavior.  The seven mental 
health questions of the PDHA are listed and reviewed below:  
1.  Were you engaged in direct combat where you fired your weapon? – “Combat” 
2.  During this deployment did you ever feel that you were in great danger of being 
killed? – “Feel” 
3.  Did you see anyone wounded, killed or dead during this deployment? – “See” 
These questions reveal combat stressor exposure in the form of seeing wounded, killed or 
dead somewhere in the deployment, but not necessarily during combat in the first 
question to feeling in danger of losing their lives to finally being exposed to direct 
combat at the level of intensity where they had to fire their weapon.  It is assumed that 
this represents a continuum in the intensity of the exposure of combat stressors by 
participants. 
4.  Over the last two weeks, how often have you been bothered by one of the following 
problems, yes or no:  - “Depression”    
 a.  Little interest or pleasure in doing things. 
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 b.  Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless. 
c. Thoughts that you would be better off dead or hurting yourself in any way. 
Any “YES” response was recorded as YES.  Three “NO” responses were recorded as NO 
for the purpose of this study and as protocol of other studies (Hoge, et al., 2006). 
5.  Have you ever had any experience that was so frightening horrible, or upsetting that, 
in the past month, you:  - “PTSD”: 
 a.  Have had nightmares about it. 
 b.  Tried hard not to think about it. 
c. Were constantly on guard. 
d. Felt numb or detached. 
Yes to two or more was recorded as YES.  No to one or zero was recorded as NO for the 
purpose of this study and as protocol of other studies (Hoge, et al., 2006). 
6.  Are you having thoughts or concerns that you may have serious conflicts with your 
spouse, family members, or close friends; that you may hurt or lose control with someone 
or both? – “Risk Iss”  A “YES” to any part of this three part question on risk behavior 
ideation was recorded as YES for the purpose of this study and as protocol of other 
studies (Hoge, et al., 2006). 
These last three questions provided an indication of the symptomology of combat 
veterans at redeployment to the extent that they are able and willing to self disclose their 
health status.  Lastly, there is a question indicating the participants’ desire to get 
behavioral health assistance: 
 
 40
7.  Are you currently interested in receiving help for stress, emotional, alcohol, or family 
problem(s)? – “Help”  These items provided an indication of symptomology across a 
spectrum of behavioral health issues.  For organizational purposes, demographic analyses 
are presented by gender, rank, and ethnicity. 
Chi-square analyses were conducted on the frequency of responses of each 
question of the PDHA to determine the independence of ethnicity, rank, and gender to 
each item to determine whether the programs were serving the population in need.  Most 
items showed significant findings at the .01 level, however, two items met a .05 level of 
significance yet did not meet a p<.01.  For these significant findings the adjusted 
standardized residuals within cells in the contingency table were used to determine which 
cells contributed to the significant chi-square distribution for each of the items (Argesti, 
1996).    The chi-square tables are presented in the sections they describe.  Tables of 
differences in statistical findings across the questions of the PDHA are presented later in 
this study. 
 Care Manager Direct Service Data (PASBA).  CM direct clinical services data 
was measured through the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) patient administration 
systems and biostatistics activity reporting system (PASBA) of the CMs of the three sites 
selected in this study.  These data were comparable to those of other large health 
information management systems in civilian settings.  Demographic characteristics such 
as age, rank, and gender were assessed during this study.  Healthcare information 
assessments involved the primary diagnoses of clients served by the CMs.  This serves as 
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a measure of actual CM services provided to the target population and for target 
problems.  This data source is used to address questions 1, 2, 3, and 5 of this study. 
 CM Prevention/Outreach Activities (IMS). Tertiary activities are also monitored.  
Using a recently developed Prevention Information Management System (IMS) 
implemented by the Army Behavioral Health Division (Appendix 1), CM outreach, 
education, and prevention activities were documented using the CM prevention/outreach 
monitoring form.  The measure was developed through interviews with CMs about 
prevention activities they conduct.  It was field tested prior to its implementation in April 
of 2006.  Activities are monitored through this information management system (IMS) 
with monthly reporting by installations.  Program totals and comparisons across 
installations were conducted as a part of this study.  This Care Manager Prevention and 
Outreach Monitoring sheet was used to address questions 1, 2, 3, and 5 of this study. 
 Care Manager Focus Groups.  The CMs are the primary study participants.  CMs 
are civilian social workers with a minimum degree of a master of social work (MSW) and 
employed on a yearly contract to provide mental health and family services to combat 
veterans and their families in support of the GWOT.  There are 30 Army Care Manger 
Programs worldwide employing 69 Care Managers.  Three installations have been 
selected to participate in this study.  CMs at these locations were invited to participate in 
focus groups providing qualitative data for this evaluation.  Focus groups consisted of 
semi-structured questions (Appendix 3) designed to obtain information about the CM’s 
experiences, opinions, and suggestions in their roles at locations from each CMP 
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implementation strategy.  Care Manager focus group information addresses research 
questions 1, 4 and 6. 
 Supervisor Interviews.  Interviews of supervisors were conducted at the selected 
sites to gain their perceptions, opinions and recommendations about the CMP.  Data from 
these interviews supported questions 1, 4 and 6 of this study.  
Procedures 
1.  Program Planner Interviews and Documents.  Interviews with managers, planners, 
and administrators were conducted at Fort Sam Houston prior to the initiation of this 
study.  These key informants were available at the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) 
through appointment at their offices.  All CMP historical documentation was provided at 
the time of these meetings.   
2.     Secondary Data Analyses.  Data from the PHDA, military healthcare system, and 
the IMS prevention monitoring sheets were used in secondary analyses to understand 
both the target population and the actual activities of the Care Managers.  This 
information allowed for an analysis of the target population and their needs and the 
ability of the CMP to address the population and their needs.  These data sources, data 
access protocol and their question application are described below: 
a. Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA).  Combat veteran self-report 
mental health status survey data was available through the Department of 
the Army, Department of Epidemiological Study from the post-deployment 
health assessment (PDHA, Appendix 2).  Department of the Army 
authorization was obtained through the Army Medical Department 
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(AMEDD) to conduct a secondary data analysis of a sample of Soldiers 
from this database.  A sample of Soldiers completing this assessment during 
the 12-month period prior to the initiation of this study was accessed 
through the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) at the 
Epidemiological Study Department at the Department of Defense in 
Washington, DC.  The Epidemiological Study Department accepted the 
request to evaluate Soldier responses for the period of 12-months (1 May 
2006 to 30 April 2006) prior to the CM activity assessment (1 May 2006 to 
31 October 2006).  The agency provided overall demographic data for 
Soldiers and frequency data on the seven behavioral health questions of the 
PDHA upon request.  Due to privacy protections and limited resources at the 
agency, individual participant information could not be released.  Variables 
of interest in this study were Soldiers’ demographics such as gender, age, 
rank, duty station (location of form completion), and ethnicity.  Access to 
this information is through the Epidemiological Study Center at the 
Department of the Army in Washington, DC.  A data request spreadsheet 
was prepared and provided to the researcher via secure department of 
defense electronic services.  All privacy information was removed from the 
data.  The researcher never had access to individual client information, 
thereby further protecting the privacy of subjects.  Upon receipt of PDHA 
data, crosstab analyses were conducted to reveal any significant trends 
across gender, rank and ethnicity for items evaluated.  These data analysis 
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procedures further identified target populations and significant statistical 
trends occurring in regard to mental health symptom reporting and combat 
stressor exposure.  These issues were highlighted in the second and third 
research questions pertaining to the target population and their behavioral 
health problems. 
b.   Military Healthcare System Records.  Access to the direct services activities 
of the CMs was provided through the AMEDD Behavioral Health Division 
(BHD) at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.  The BHD was requested to provide 
CM activity reports of the CMs from the three sites selected for the 6-month 
period of April to September 2006.  Demographic data was gathered as well 
as primary conditions treated by the CMs 
c. Care Manager Prevention and Outreach Monitoring Sheet.  Installations 
submitted a monthly record of their tertiary activities for the six-month 
monitoring period of the evaluation.  The measure provided prevention 
activities and descriptive data on clients served in the way of briefings, 
treatment/education groups, care line contacts, outreach and education 
(Appendix 1).  The monitoring record was submitted electronically on a 
monthly basis from April to September 2006.   
3.  Care Manger Focus Group/Supervisor Interviews.  At the end of the monitoring 
period each site participating in the study was visited.  CMs were invited to participate in 
semi-structured focus groups for further understanding of the CMP at their installations.  
The focus group protocol is provided in Appendix C of this study.  Informed consent was 
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attained by all participants who had the opportunity to decline to participate at any time.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with superiors pertaining to the same subject 
areas as the CM focus groups.   
Summary 
 This study used multiple measures to gain formative process and implementation 
data concerning the CMP.  By understanding the process and implementation of the 
CMP, the ability of Soldiers to be served and target issues to be addressed can be 
recognized.  Furthermore, by investigating the program at its early stages, researchers and 
programmers can verify the program, understand differences among program strategies, 
and make incremental changes to improve the program.  The next chapter will report the 





 This chapter presents the study's results.  The chapter is organized by the six 
research questions.  For organizational purposes, the first research question, pertaining to 
the overall program implementation, is the last question addressed because questions 2-6 
reveal supporting data for this overarching question.  Results for research questions 2 and 
3 are presented simultaneously because the data supporting them occur concurrently in 
the measures used in this study (PDHA, CHCS direct care services, and the Prevention 
Monitoring Sheet). 
Research Questions Results 
Research Questions 2 & 3.  Questions 2 and 3 of this study investigated 2 of the 3 central 
questions of program evaluation.  These questions explore the degree to which the 
program reached its target population (Question 2), and in a parallel fashion, the degree 
to which the program addressed the target issues (Question 3).  The CMP's overall target 
population is Soldiers and their families returning from war with any behavioral health 
problems or issues pertaining to unidentified health problems.  Unidentified (otherwise 
undiagnosable) health problems are historically common among veterans of wars making 
them difficult to diagnose and treat.  The focus of this evaluation is limited to Soldiers 
participating in and returning from war. The PDHA provided the most current 
information about trauma exposure and the mental health needs of this population.  
Although the program is available to those in any stage of the deployment cycle 
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(preparing to deploy, on deployment, and returning from deployment), most client 
problems manifest after exposure to combat stressors and at redeployment.  The target 
population of this study was Soldiers returning from combat and completing the PDHA 
assessment (as required my Army policy) and there is an immediate target population of 
those reporting behavioral health symptoms on the PDHA after returning from war. A 
demographic analysis of the PDHA adds to understanding the target population and 
provides insight into potential target issues by identifying characteristics of this 
population and issues experienced at redeployment.  Chi-square analyses were conducted 
on the frequency of YES responses of each question of the PDHA to determine the 
independence of rank, ethnicity, and gender across each item to answer the second 
research question.  It identified populations who over report conditions and can be 
identified as vulnerable groups for service provision analysis.  For these analyses, the 
within cells adjusted standardized residuals in the contingency table were used to 
determine which cells contributed to the significant chi-square distribution for each of the 
items.  The within cells adjusted standardized residuals takes into account the large 
individual cell contribution of the statistical procedure, thereby controlling for the large 
differences in cell contribution of variables and between categories of variables (Argesti, 
1996).   
Research Question 2:  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) 
reaching the target population?  To assess characteristics of the CM target population, a 
sample of 231,978 Soldiers completing the PDHA form during a 1-year period prior to 
the CM monitoring period was studied.  Table 4.1 reveals the overall population 
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frequency and percentages of combat stressor exposure and mental health issues that 
combat veterans reported, further defining characteristics and issues of the target 
population.  This information will be combined with CM activity reports to indicate the 
degree to which the program served the target population (research question 2) and its 
target issues (research question 3) using CHCS direct care services reporting and the CM 
Prevention and Outreach Monitoring Sheet.   
Table 4.1  Number and Percentage of deployed Soldiers Reporting PDHA Issues  
(Total N=231,978) 
Number Item Number Yes  % of Total 
1 See       104,604  45% 
2 Feel         97,740  42% 
3 Combat         43,564  19% 
4 Depression         52,102  22% 
5 PTSD         24,969  11% 
6 Risk Issues         22,495  10% 
7 Help         13,649  6% 
Note:  Deployed Soldier data provided by The Defense Medical Surveillance System (2006).   
 
Nearly half of the Soldiers surveyed observed others killed, wounded, or dead and 
felt in great danger of being killed (45% and 42%, respectively) (Table 4.1).  Nearly 20% 
of those redeploying reported being in direct combat where they fired their weapons.  
Soldiers reported depression symptoms at a rate of 22% and PTSD symptoms and risk 
issues at 11% and 10%, respectively, but only 6% of those surveyed reported interest in 
receiving mental health services.  
Age.  The age range for clients receiving services from CMs was 18 to 64.  The 
average ages of those reporting behavioral health issues (PDHA respondents) for males 
were between 27 and 28 and for females it was between 25 and 27.  The average age for 
those receiving CM direct care was 27, as was the median age for the six-month 
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monitoring period.  The age group most often treated was 22 (modal age: n=554).    
These results indicate CMP success in reaching the target population by age.  
Rank.  The vast majority of those deployed were enlisted personnel; 86% were 
enlisted personnel and 14% were commissioned and warrant officers.  Therefore, enlisted 
Soldiers are expected to be exposed to combat stressors in greater numbers and 
experience more behavioral health issues.  Among the enlisted deployed personnel (86% 
of the deploying force), 39% were lower enlisted and 47% were senior enlisted.  Of those 
receiving direct treatment from CMs monitored, 95% were enlisted (52% lower and 43% 
senior enlisted respectively) (Table 4.2).  The enlisted force was treated at a considerably 
higher rate than they deployed (86%), however this group represented with the greatest 
combat stressor exposure (91% of those reporting combat exposure, 89% of those 
reporting feeling in great danger of being killed, and 86% of those saw death and dying).   
Table 4.2.  Deployed and CM Direct Treatment by Rank 
          Soldiers      Soldiers 
         Deployed      Treated 
Rank % Total # % Total # 
Lower Enlisted 39% 90,304 52% 3,056
Senior Enlisted 47% 110,008 43% 2,573
Junior Officer 7% 16,305 4% 233
Senior Officer 5% 10,478 1% 39
Warrant Officer 2% 4,761 0% 23
   Total 100% 231,856 100% 5,924
Note:  No rank recorded on 252 Medical Department provider activity cases.  
Note:  Source – Defense Medical Surveillance System; Army Medical Department Provider Activity Reporting. 
To measure significant differences among PDHA YES responses by rank, Chi-square 
analyses were conducted of the seven items of the PDHA Soldier Self Assessment by 
rank. Table 4.3 summarizes these seven Chi-square analyses.   
 
 50
Table 4.3  Summary of Chi-Square Analyses of Soldiers at Each Rank Who 
Reported YES to PDHA Items  
   % of YES Respondents        Adj. Std. Residual LOS X2 df 
 E1-4 E5-9 O1-3 O4- WO E1-4 E5-9 O1-3 O4- WO    
Seen 38.9 46.7 8 4.4 2 -0.8 -6.4 16.4 -1.6 -2 0 276 4
Feel 39.6 49.2 6.4 3.1 1.7 5.2 14.8 -10.5 -28 -10 0 1072 4
Combt 43 47.6 6.2 1.7 1.6 19.1 50 7.7 -31 -8 0 1279 4
Deprsn 46.9 44.7 4.9 2.4 1.2 42.3 -14.5 -21.6 -26.8 -16.2 0 2584 4
PTSD 43.9 47.3 5.1 2.6 1 16.9 -0.4 -12.1 -15 -12 0 681 4
RskIss 45 47.3 4.3 2.4 1 19.5 .   –.5 -17.1 -16 -11 0 868 4
HlpSkg 42.1 50.5 4 2.5 0.9 7.7 7.4 -14.1 -12 -10 0 476 4  
Note:   This table summarizes the seven Chi-square statistical analyses by rank used to provide the data for figures 4.1 A.  and 4.2 B. 
below.  The table condenses the Rank * PDHA items Chi-square statistics.  The table contains the percentage of Soldiers responding 
YES to combat exposure and behavioral health symptoms of the PDHA, the adjusted standardized residual representing the within 
cells contribution to the Chi-square statistic, the p value, and the Chi-square statistic for reach PDHA item. 
This table shows the respondent percentage of combat stressor exposure (Items 1-3) and 
reported behavioral health conditions (Items 4-7) and the adjusted standardized residual 
of the chi-square statistic.  The adjusted standardized residual shows the degree to which 
each rank category deviates from that which would be expected by chance for each of the 
PDHA items while accounting for the large differences in the size of the groups.  The 
statistic indicates any over or under representation in combat stressor exposure and 
behavioral health conditions. Large deviations may reveal vulnerable ranks to consider 
for appropriate treatment and prevention services.  Lastly, the level of significance, Chi-
square value and degrees of freedom are included in the table.  This table supports Figure 
4.1 A. and B. which are graphic representations of the rank responses across the all of the 






Figure 4.1 Combat Exposure and Behavioral Health Conditions by  
Percentages and Adjusted Standardized Residual Separated by Rank 
          A. Soldiers Reporting PDHA            B. Corresponding Adj. Std Res. for PDHA Items                                     
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Note:  The first chart presents the percentages of redeployed Soldiers reporting YES responses on the seven items of the PDHA by 
Rank.  The second chart displays the within cells contribution to the Chi-square statistic, thus indicating the degree to which each 
cell/item  was over or under-represented from that which would be expected by chance.  The first three items reflect combat stressor 
exposure from (1) seeing dead, wounded or killed, (2) Feeling in great danger of being killed, and (3) being in direct combat where 
they fired their weapon.  The last four items refer to mental health conditions: (4) Depression, (5) PTSD, (6) Risk Issues and (7) 
Interest in Receiving Help.  
Figure 4.1 A.  This table shows the differences in the extent to which Soldiers at each 
rank were exposed to combat (seen, felt, combat) compared to their reports of PTSD, 
depression, risk issues, and desire for help)  Figure 4.1 B is a line graph of the Chi-square 
adjusted standardized residual across the items of the PDHA for rank as well.  This figure 
displays the statistical over or under representation of categories of Rank from that which 
would be expected by chance (Figure 4.1 B).   
In Figure 4.2.A, the percentage of PDHA conditions by rank category are shown.  
Junior commissioned officers (yellow line, O1-O3 rank), senior commissioned officers 
(light blue line, O4-O9), and warrant officers (purple line, W1-W4) each represent less 
that 10% of those responding YES to all items of the PDHA, as would be expected by 
their low contribution to the total numbers of those deploying and their participation in 
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direct combat.  Enlisted Soldiers were the majority of those responding YES to all items 
of the PDHA.  Enlisted leaders, (pink line on Figure 4.2 A, E5-E9 ranks) represented the 
majority of those exposed to combat stressors (47% of those seeing killed, wounded, or 
dead, 49% of those feeling in great danger of being killed, and 48% of those in direct 
combat).  And although they do request some assistance, these enlisted leaders are less 
likely to report depression than other mental health issues.  Junior enlisted Soldiers (blue 
line and those in the rank of E1-E4) Are the second most likely to report combat exposure 
on the PDHA, 39% of those report seeing killed wounded or dead, 40% report feeling in 
danger of dying, and 43% of those participating in direct combat.   
The statistical analysis of Soldiers PDHA YES responses by rank (Figure 4.1B) 
also reveals that senior officers (light blue line, O1-O3 rank) and warrant officers (purple 
line, W1-W4 rank) are underrepresented in their combat stressor exposure compared to 
other ranks (first three PDHA responses) and their behavioral health needs (items 4-7).  
Junior officers (yellow line, O1-O3 rank) report seeing more wounded, dead or dying and 
a slight higher rate of direct combat than would be expected by chance.  The enlisted 
leaders (E5-E9 ranks and pink line on Figure 4.1 B.), however, are highly over 
represented in their rate of direct combat and moderately over represented in feeling that 
their lives were in great danger, but regardless of this combat stressor exposure 
overrepresentation, they under report depression issues and report risk issues and PTSD 
symptoms at rates equivalent to that of chance occurrence.  This is despite the fact that 
they are greatly over represented in combat stressor exposure (Figure 4.1 B. pink line). 
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Junior officers are statistically over represented in the number of those seeing 
wounded, dead, or killed during the deployment. Although junior officers are the 3rd most 
likely rank to report combat activity (6.2%), chi squared analysis showed that they were 
extremely underrepresented in reporting behavioral health issues (Depression 4.9%, 
adjusted standard residual (asr) –21.6; PTSD 5.1%, asr –12.3; Risk Issues 4.3%, asr –
17.1) and help seeking behavior (4%, asr –14.1) (Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2).   Similarly, 
senior enlisted Soldiers were disproportionately represented among those reporting 
combat stressor exposure and experiencing direct combat, however, they greatly 
underreported mental health issues.  Although scant in reporting, this population may 
defer symptoms and have difficulty recognizing such symptoms.  Senior enlisted 
experience more trauma; underreport symptoms, slightly underrepresented in treatment 
(Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 A & B).   
Although Senior Officers are generally engaged in low combat activities, there 
was a spike in direct treatment for 05 (Lieutenant Colonel) rank (n=23).  E4 (lower 
enlisted rank) had the highest rate of treatment followed by E5 (first leader rank of senior 
enlisted).  The enlisted ranks were those expected to have the highest rate of combat 
stressor exposure.  Direct Services of the CMs overall appears to have reached the target 
population by rank.  (Table 4.2) 
 Ethnicity.  Among ethnicities, White Soldiers reported the highest rate of combat 
activity and seeing wounded killed or dead.  However they report mental health 
symptoms at significantly lower rates compared to others who experienced high levels of 
exposure.  Whites were statistically underrepresented in comparison to all other 
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ethnicities, which were overrepresented in reporting symptoms (Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2 
A and B).   
 As shown in Figures 4.2 A and B, and supported in Table 4.4, Hispanic and Other 
ethnicities are under 10% of the population experiencing combat exposure trauma (Figure 
4.2 A, yellow line representing Hispanic, light blue line representing Other ethnicities) 
and their statistical representation is close that which would be expected by chance or 
slightly below for seeing killed, wounded or dead and for participating in direct combat.  
These two categories were slightly over represented in feeling is if their lives were in 
danger (4.2 B, same color identifications).  Blacks had the second highest percentage of 
combat exposure trauma and help seeking behavior (Figure 4.2 A, pink line across PDHA 
items).  Their help seeking behavior peeked at 25% of the respondents while their direct 
combat activity was 12%, viewing of death and dying was 14%, and feeling that they 
were in great danger of dying was 20% of those deployed (Table 4.4, and Figure 4.2 A, 
pink line).  Figure 4.2 B (and Table 4.4) shows that Blacks were statistically 
underrepresented in those participating in direct combat and seeing death and dying 
during the deployment, but overrepresented in seeking help and reporting depression and 
risk issues.  Whites, on the other hand, had an opposite statistical response rate than 
Blacks for items of the PDHA.  Whites, as the highest deploying ethnicity category were 
the majority of those experiencing combat exposure stressors and desire for help (Table 
4.4 and Figure 4.2 A, dark blue line).  However, Whites were greatly statistically 
overrepresented in those participating in direct combat and seeing killed, wounded or 
dead, yet underrepresented in those acknowledging that they felt their lives were in 
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danger and that they felt depression symptoms, experienced risk issues, or were interested 
in help.  The only item for White participants that approximated what would be expected 
was their reporting of PTSD symptoms (63% of respondents, Adj Std Res: -7.5, p<.000, 
x2=95.38, df=3).   
Table 4.4  Summary of Chi-Square Analyses of Soldiers at Each Ethnicity 




square   Df 
 W B H O W B H O    
Seen 70% 14% 9% 6% 45 -48.6 -5.4 -3.7 0 2668   3 
Feel 63% 20% 10% 5% -19.1 11.2 11.8 5.1 0 378   3 
Combat 73% 12% 9% 6% 34.9 -37 -0.9 -8.1 0 1594   3 
Deprsn 62% 21% 11% 7% -20.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 4.356   3 
PTSD 63% 19% 11% 7% -7.5 1.6 8.9 1.3 0 95.38   3 
RskIss 59% 22% 12% 7% -22 15.3 12 4 0 487.2   3 
HlpSkg 55% 25% 13% 7% -26.2 21.1 12.9 2 0 753.4   3 
Note:   This table summarizes the seven Chi-square statistical analyses by ethnicity used to provide the data for figures 
4.2 A and 4.2  B below.  The table condenses the Ethnicity * PDHA items Chi-square statistics.  The table contains the 
number of Soldiers reporting conditions/experiences, the percentage of  Soldier reporting  combat exposure stress 
exposures and behavioral health issues by ethnicity, the Chi-square adjusted standardized residual representing the 
within cells contribution to the Chi-square statistic, the p value, and the Chi-square statistic for each PDHA item. 
* Note:   Ethnic breakdown was not available for CM Activity. 




Figure 4.2   
Combat Exposure and Behavioral Health Conditions by Percentages and  
Adjusted Standardized Residual Separated by Ethnicity 
              A. Soldiers Reporting PDHA       B. Corresponding Adjusted Standard Residual 
                   Conditions by Ethnicity                 (over/under representation of ethnicity)  
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Note:  The first chart presents the percentages of redeployed Soldiers reporting YES responses on the seven items of the PDHA by 
ethnicity.  The second chart displays the within cells contribution to the Chi-square statistic, thus indicating the degree to which each 
cell/item  was over or under-represented from that which would be expected by chance.  The first three items reflect combat stressor 
exposure from (1) seeing dead, wounded or killed, (2) Feeling in great danger of being killed, and (3) being in direct combat where 
they fired their weapon.  The last four items refer to mental health conditions: (4) Depression, (5) PTSD, (6) Risk Issues and (7) 
Interest in Receiving Help.  
For understanding the target population, it is clear that the rates of reporting combat 
stressor exposure were far greater than the indication of any mental health conditions.  It 
is understood that not all of those experiencing even the greatest of combat stressors will 
develop mental health problems.  However, under reporting of mental health conditions 
and need for help in comparison to their exposure was universal among ethnic groups and 
most evident among Whites (Figure 4.2 A and B).   
A large proportion of the target population was White as determined by their 
identification of issues and combat stressor exposure, but a considerable number of those 
deploying was persons of color (35%).  Data regarding CM activity provided for this 
study did not provide thorough ethnic breakdown of the data.  The extent to which the 
 
 57
CMP reached the target population in terms of ethnicity is, therefore, beyond the 
capabilities of this study. 
Gender.  The deploying force over the course of the study was 89% males and 
11% female (males were 86% of the active duty force).  Nearly 3% of these females 
revealed seeing killed wounded or dead, 3% felt in danger of losing their lives and 1.8% 
reported experiencing direct combat during the deployment.  Nearly 13% of those 
expressing interest in receiving mental health assistance were female, 87% of those 
reporting interest in help were male.  Males accounted for the vast majority of those 
reporting mental health conditions; 88% of those reporting depression symptoms, and 
90% of both those reporting PTSD symptoms and risk issues.  (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3 
A).   
Table 4.5  Summary of Chi-Square Analyses for PDHA YES Responses by Gender 
  % of YES Respondents Adj. Std. Residual LOS X2 df 
 Male  Female  Male  Female   
Seen 94  6   64.8  -64.8   0 4198 1 
Feel 92.9  7.1   46.4  -46.4   0 2150 1 
Combt 98.2  1.8   66.2  -66.2   0 4382 1 
Deprsn 87.7  12.3   -14.9  14.9   0 223 1 
PTSD 89.8  10.2   2.1  -2.1   0.1 4.33 1 
RskIss 89.1  10.9   -2  2   0.1 3.83 1 
HlpSkg 87.1  12.9   -9.2  9.2   0 85 1 
Note:   This table summarizes the seven Chi-square statistical analyses by gender used to provide the data for figures 4.1 and 4.2 
above.  The table condenses the gender * PDHA items Chi-square statistics.  The table contains the percentage of the total YES 
responses for combat stressor exposure (Items 1-3) and behavioral health problems, the adjusted standardized residual representing 
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Note:  The first chart presents the percentages of redeployed Soldiers reporting YES responses on the seven items of the PDHA by 
Gender.  The second chart displays the within cells contribution to the Chi-square statistic, thus indicating the degree to which each 
item was over or under-represented from that which would be expected by chance.  The first three items reflect combat stressor 
exposure from (1) seeing dead, wounded or killed, (2) Feeling in great danger of being killed, and (3) being in direct combat where 
they fired their weapon.  The last four items refer to mental health conditions: (4) Depression, (5) PTSD, (6) Risk Issues and (7) 
Interest in Receiving Help.  
 
Figure 4.3 A and B supported by Table 4.5 reveals that males (blue line Figure 4.3) were 
the vast majority of those experiencing combat stressor exposure (Items 1-3) and 
reporting behavioral health issues (Items 4-7).  However, Chi-square statistical analyses 
of the YES responses of the PDHA revealed that males report more combat exposure and 
under reported all behavioral health issues of the PDHA (Figure 4.3 B, blue line).  So 
despite male respondents disproportional exposure to combat stressor exposure, they still 
consistently under report behavioral health issues.  This lack of reporting represents 




CM activity records indicate that of those receiving direct care, 85% (n=5243) 
were male and 15% (n=933) were female (Table 4.6).  In addition, females, who were 
generally more likely to request and seek treatment, were more likely on average to do so 
within the CMP during the six months of this study.  Although males experience combat 
stressor exposure at a far greater rate, they remain under represented in treatment. 
Table 4.6  Percentage (and Total Number) of Soldiers Deploying and CM Direct 
Treatment  
      Soldiers   Soldiers 
      Deployed    Treated 
Gender % Total # % Total # 
Male 89% 207,493 85% 5243
Female 11% 24,485 15% 933
   Total 100% 231,978 100% 6176
Note:    Source – Defense Medical Surveillance System; Army Medical Department Provider Activity Reporting       
 
Research Question 3:  To what extent does the Care Manager Program (CMP) address 
the target issues?  Critical symptomological data was derived from the 231,978 Soldiers 
deployed and responding to the mandatory PDHA assessment.  These questions allowed 
comparisons of exposure rates and symptom reporting among Soldiers to the activities of 
CMs.  The PDHA assessed Depression, PTSD symptoms, risk issues and interest for 
behavioral health or relationship issues.  CMs direct care services recording (from the 
Army Medical Department Healthcare Reporting System) revealed diagnoses treated.  Of 
all conditions reported by Soldiers, 52% were depression, 25% were PTSD, and 23% 




Percentages of Issues Reported by Soldiers and Treated by CMs 
   %  Soldier Self %  Soldiers 
Behavioral Health Issues Report (PDHA) Treated (CHCS)
Depression/Mood Issue 52% 10% 
PTSD 25% 20% 
Risk Issues 23% n/a 
General Counseling n/a 29% 
Adjustment Reaction n/a 22% 
Stress and Anxiety n/a 6% 
Interpersonal n/a 6% 
Other n/a 7% 
    Total 100 100% 
Note: n/a indicates categories not recorded in the measure. 
 
Analysis of CM direct care activities revealed that most treatment was recorded 
conservatively, with diagnoses of general counseling (29%) followed by treatment of 
adjustment reactions (22%).  PTSD was diagnosed in 20% of the counseling services.  
Mood disorders and depression accounted for 10% of the treatment followed by 
interpersonal issues (6%) and anxiety and stress reactions (6%).  Seven percent of the 
conditions treated by CMs during the six-month monitoring period were other conditions 
such as medical conditions, substance use conditions, and head injuries (Figure 4.7). 
CM duties are not limited to direct care activities.  Prevention, education and 
outreach are included in the care managers' duties and addressed behavioral health and 
relationship needs of Soldiers.  Monitoring of care managers' tertiary activities shows that 
over 6000 people were served, including Soldiers, family members, leaders, and 
providers (on and off of the installation).  These services included post-deployment 
debriefings, medical discharge classes, family re-integration after deployment classes as 
well as classes pertaining to behavioral health conditions.  Furthermore, CMs educated 
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other mental health professionals, such as medical interns, physicians, general medical 
providers on how to best serve Soldiers with behavioral health issues through training, 
outreach, and consultation.  Briefings to families and Soldiers were tailored and delivered 
individually and pertained to such target issues as family-relational issues, coping with 
PTSD, and post-war health concerns of seriously injured Soldiers.  These services can be 
broken down into categories of briefings, treatment prevention groups, 
outreach/command consultation and care line contacts. (Table 4.8)  
Table 4.8  Care Manager Prevention, Outreach, & Education Activity:  Clients Served 
(# of Meetings) 
  Totals    
Briefings 5987    (90)  
Support Groups 189     (51)  
Outreach 97     (40)  
Care Line 49     (49)  
Totals 6322   (230)  
Note:  Source –Army Medical Department Provider Prevention Activity Reporting 
 
Briefings were the most commonly occurring of all CM activities and reached 
nearly 6000 Soldiers.  Support groups covered family-relational reintegration issues, 
medical discharge, and PTSD/adjustment issues and reached nearly 200 service members.  
This particular activity was shared with other behavioral health programs and covered 
topics and personnel not already being addressed by other agencies. In addition, CMs 
were involved in substantive outreach, whereupon leaders or other providers received 
consultations or were cross-trained or consulted in behavioral health issues.  These 
outreach activities served nearly 100 personnel (Table 4.8).  
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 Lastly, staff at the independent program site established an outreach program to 
reach personnel who may be resistant to more conspicuous contacts.  They established a 
care line that provided screening, education, and referral on an immediate and 
anonymous basis.  Several of these contacts led to crisis intervention, but the vast 
majority led to consultations and referrals for those who may have resisted inquiries due 
to fears of stigmatization.  During the six-month period, 49 persons (some Soldiers, some 
family members) were served through the independent program site's anonymous care 
line service (Table 4.8).  During this six-month monitoring period, almost as many 
persons were reached in prevention and outreach capacities as through direct services.   
Research Question 4:  How is the Care Manager Program (CMP) implemented across 
various installations?  The CMP was implemented under “mutual adaptation,” which is a 
commonly used program management approach.  This approach to program 
implementation creates broad guidelines and allows local management to implement the 
program as needed within established parameters.  The CMP was established with broad 
goals, CMs were hired through contractors, and the program was funded and staffed at 
power platform installations.  Power platforms are major centralized installations where 
U.S. Army deployments are orchestrated both in and outside the United States.  Because 
all deploying Soldiers pass through power platform installations, they are ideal locations 
for CMs to provide enhanced screening and services.  The CMP was locally organized 
and implemented by senior leading behavioral health staff in these installations.   
Based on previous inquiries by the Army Department of Behavioral Health, three 
general CMP management strategies were recognized across the power platforms.  These 
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strategies were independent program, augmentation force, and sole provider.  This study 
investigated one installation representing each of these management styles.  The 
independent program was integrated within the large community of mental health 
programs on its installation.  These programs include Social Work Services, the 
Department of Behavioral Health, Psychiatric Services, Division Mental Health and 
Hospital Case Managers.  The independent CMP strategy works independent of and in 
conjunction with these programs to reach their target population.  The sole provider site 
represented power platform installations that served reserve units’ deployment activities.  
Such installations process and coordinate transportation for National Guard and Reserve 
units to deployment locations.  Processing includes records verification, mental health 
education and screening, legal consultations, pay issues, etc.  These programs have 
smaller staffs, often times just one or two CMs.  Lastly, the augmentation force 
represented the third management implementation style whereupon CMPs are dispersed 
throughout the community of installation mental health agencies and serve as an 
augmentation force.  Under this strategy, behavioral health agencies and medical units are 
augmented with CMs.  A major combat unit received two CMs that work out of their 
health clinic and visit units for behavioral health training.  They also augment hospital 
social work services on their installation.   
Independent Program.  This program had the highest number of staff as well as a 
supervisor solely assigned to them.  It exists on the largest installation, which has a major 
medical center (MEDCEN).  The MEDCEN increases the volume of activity and the 
number of injured and traumatized Soldiers returning to the installation and referred to 
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CMs.  The actual CMs are not located centrally.  Rather they are placed at strategic 
locations within the healthcare system throughout the post.  CMs are at medical clinics 
and demobilization centers.  Monthly meetings of all the CMs are conducted for 
continuity.  The supervisor is located in the installation Department of Social Work 
Services, along side other program leaders.   
Argumentation Force.  This CMP strategy represented an implementation 
philosophy that augmented agencies in an effective pre-existing system of behavioral 
health care to Soldiers and families.  A very experienced supervisor was selected to 
supervise CMs as an additional duty to her present management requirements.  The three 
CMs were placed in troop medical clinics (embedded within a large military unit) and the 
hospital.   
Sole Provider.  Many power platform installations with CMPs are active duty or 
reserve installations that serve the deployments of Reserve and National Guard units.  
These installations may have less activity and the units do not remain localized after 
redeployment.  This being the case, fewer CMs (and often just one CM) are assigned to 
augment mental health services.  In these cases, available supporting locations are sought 
to enable the CM to perform his/her duties and receive clients.  In the case of the sole 
provider site in this study, the CM was placed at the installation hospital, and later, in the 
Army Community Services building.  The CM was moved so his direct services clients 
could receive reception, intake paperwork, and waiting room services, which was not 
available to him at the hospital.  He also was given resources and office space at the 
demobilization site as he provided a high percentage of services there.   
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Based on provider focus group and supervisor interview data, these three 
implementation strategies-- independent, augmentation, and sole provider-- resulted in 
very similar programming.  Irrespective of the implementation style, CMs were all placed 
forward in units, separate and unique from other behavioral health services, and aptly 
designated for duties to those with combat experiences and post-deployment problems.  
All sites studied were integrated into the healthcare systems and differed greatly from 
stereotypical behavioral health services.  In all cases, CMs were able to establish 
informal/ less stigmatized routes to treatment as well as formal appointment/office calls 
for counseling services. 
Research Question 5:  How do installations and implementation venues of the Care 
Manager Program (CMP) differ in their service the target population?  This question 
addressed how each CMP reached the target population and addressed target issues.  
Males were 89% of the deploying population and constituted 85% of those treated.  
Individual installations closely mirrored this average.  Of clients served with direct 
mental health services 86% were male clients at the independent program site, 81% at the 
augmentation site, and 85% at the sole provider site.  The average age for those receiving 
treatment at the various installations however, was 29 at independent program and 
augmentation sites and 27 at the sole provider site.  
 Direct service breakdown by rank revealed that 95% of the services were 
provided to enlisted personnel overall.  The independent program site's enlisted 
percentage was 95%, with the sole provider and augmentation site receiving 92% and 
96% direct services, respectively.  Enlisted Soldiers were treated at higher rates than their 
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presence in the overall population across installations.  For the other service members, 
commissioned and warrant officers receiving (O1-O3, O4-O6, & WO), the percentage of 
the treatment received was small for the 6-month monitoring period due to higher 
proportion of enlisted personnel in the force (Table 4.9). 
Table 4.9  Percentages of CM Direct Services Rank Groups 
Rank Independent Sole Provider Augmentation Total
E1-E4 55 54 58 55 
E5-E9 41 38 38 40 
O1-O3 3 6 3 4 
O4-O6 0 2 1 1 
W 1 0 0 0 
Total % 100 100 100 100 
Note:  Source – Army Medical Department Provider Activity Reporting. 
 Not only was the CMP implemented in three unique strategies, it was also 
implemented at three installations with very unique program characteristics.  Both the 
target population and their needs reflect the characteristics of their installations.  A cycle 
of deployment was one such factor.  If an installation recently returned from deployment, 
the CMs will be engaged in unit prevention education, screening, and direct services.  If 
the installation is between deployments, then cases needing intensive services may be 
lower in number.  The size of the installation is another key installation characteristic.  A 
final important installation is the Soldiers they serve as a power platform.  If the power 
platform they serve consists of reserve/national guard units, then much of the target 
population will disperse to the states they originated from and other behavioral health 
services will address the long-term needs of its target population.  The ability of each of 
the program strategies to meet the needs of their target populations will be presented by 
installation.  Figure 4.5 reviews the overall breakdown of CM direct services and Table 
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4.11 displays a complete diagnostic account of treatments by the DMS IV categories 
further illuminating the clinical services CMs provide.   
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Note:  Source – Defense Medical Surveillance System; Army Medical Department Provider Activity Reporting                               
 Independent Program Site.  The independent program site was located on the 
largest military installation and with second largest troop population and numerous 
combat units.  The units on this installation were also in the midst of heavy troop 
movements, both departing and returning from combat duty.  And lastly, this was the 
only installation of the CMP sites studied that had a major medical center (MEDCEN).  
The MEDCEN serves as a treatment site for complex medical evacuees that the other 
installations could not serve.  All these factors increased the likelihood and intensity of 
conditions of the target population in comparison to the other sites studied.   
 At the independent program site, PTSD cases constitute the largest group of cases 
(27%).  This was the highest PTSD treatment rate across installations as well.  
Adjustment disorder diagnoses were coded for 18% their direct care followed by mood 
disorder treatment at 10% (equal to the augmentation site). Lastly, stress/anxiety 
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conditions and interpersonal problems both accounted for 4% of their treatment.  (Table 
4.11).   
 Augmentation Site.  The augmentation site was on an installation of combat units 
that began a major deployment cycle approximately two years prior to the study during 
the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  During these stages the casualties were low 
and there was little combat activity.  Exposure to combat stressors was low in comparison 
to the activities of installations on recent deployments like the independent program site.  
Currently, several units of the augmentation site were preparing for another deployment 
cycle.   
 The augmentation site used the adjustment reaction diagnosis most frequently 
(40% of those receiving direct treatment on their installation).  Stress and anxiety was the 
second most frequent condition treated (14%), followed by interpersonal issues (14%), 
mood disorders (13), and lastly PTSD accounted for 7% of treatment.  Lower rates of 
more complicated conditions (PTSD/Mood disorders) may be associated with the time 
since experiencing combat (Table 4.11). 
 Sole Provider Site.  The sole provider site was located on a smaller installation 
which housed support units and also served as the only power platform of this study that 
served reserve/national guard units.  At the sole provider site, general counseling 
accounted for 87% of treatment, followed by 4% adjustment reactions, 3% PTSD, and 
2% both Stress/anxiety and mood disorders.  The sole provider site reported the lowest 
rate of PTSD and Mood disorder treatment, and coded most contacts as general 
counseling and adjustment disorders.  Active duty units on this installation were support 
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units and likely not exposed to the combat activity of the other installations studied.  This 
may account for the lower rates of PTSD treatment. (Table 4.11) 
          
          Table 4.11 
          Problems Treated by Care Managers By Installation From 1 MAY to 31 October 06: Total/(%) 
          Diagnoses & Disorders                          Independent      Augmentation   Sole Provider  Total  
            1. Disorders of Childhood                   7  (0%)                 1   (0%)            6  (0%)        14  (0%) 
            2. Delirium, Amnesias, Cognitive     25  (  .8%)              0   (0%)            0  (0%)        25  (0%)   
            3. Gen. Medical Condition Root         5  (0%)                 1   (0%)            0  (0%)         6  (0%)      
            4. Substance-Related                           2   (0%)               11   (0%)            1  (0%)        14  (0%) 
            5. Psychotic Disorders    1   (0%)                0   (0%)             1  (0%)          2  (0%)   
            6. Mood Disorders                            330  (10%)           141  (13%)          37  (3%)    508  (8%) 
            7. Anxiety Disorders, Stress Rctns  136  (4%)             154  (14%)          28  (2%)    318  (5%)     
                 7.b. PTSD                           902 (27%)              78  (7%)            53  (5%)   1033(17%) 
            8. Somatoform Disorders    0  (0%)   0  (0%)   0  (0%)   0  (0%)      
            9. Fictitious Disorders    0  (0%)   0  (0%)   0  (0%)   0  (0%)    
           10. Dissociate Disorders 4  (0%)   0  (0%)      0  (0%)       4  (0%)    
           11. Sexual and Gender Identity    0  (0%)   0  (0%)   0  (0%)   0  (0%)  
           12. Eating Disorders    0  (0%)   0  (0%)   0  (0%)   0  (0%)   
           13. Sleep Disorders 37   (1%)                  5  (0%)    0  (0%)       42  (0%) 
           14. Impulse Control Dis NEC    8  (0%)                  9  (0%)             0  (0%)        17  (0%)   
           15. Adjustment Disorders 596(18%)             448  (40%)          74  (4%)   1118 (18%) 
           16. Personality Disorders    17(  .5%)               2  (0%)              6  (0%)       25  (0%) 
           17. Interpersonal Issues 144 (4%)              154  (14%)            8 (0%)      306  (5%) 
           18. General Counseling      0(0%)                  1  (0%)        1526(86%)   1527(25%) 
           19. Other Conditions 158 (4%)                20  (2%)              0  (0%)    178 (3%) 
            20. Observation   26 ( .8%)                0  (0%)              0  (0%)      26  (0%) 
           21. Diagnosis Left Blank 913(27%)               85  (8%)              6  (0%)   1004(16%)         
                 Totals  3312 (97.1)         1110 (98%)       754 (100%) 6176 (97%)         
                Note:  Source – Army Medical Department Provider Activity Reporting.  Rounding of % decreased total % values. 
 
 Overall the CMPs addressed target issues, but their treatment rates of conditions 
differed greatly across the sites studied.  As likely needed by the target population, the 
rate of PTSD treatment was highest at the independent program sites (27% of treatment 
compared to 7% and 5%).  The sole provider site reported higher rates of general 
counseling and lower rates of more serious conditions (PTSD/Mood disorders) than the 
other installations.  This too may be attributed to installation characteristics.  This 
installation does not house combat arms troops (rather support activity units) and 
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reserve/national guard units exposed to higher degrees of combat stressors soon return to 
their local installations and are served by other agencies.  Treatment rates by conditions 
differed greatly across the installations studied.  The differences in the treatment rates, 
however, are associated with unique characteristics and needs of units of the installation.   
Research Questions 6:  What are the perceptions and attitudes of Care Managers (CM)?  
Semi structured focus groups were conducted at each installation to ascertain the 
perceptions, attitudes and experiences of the CMs themselves.  Semi structured 
interviews of CM supervisors were also part of the qualitative data used in this multi-
method evaluation.  The overarching topics of discussion were 1)  The perception of the 
mission of the CMP; 2) The duties they perform; 3)  The strengths of the program; 4)  
Unintended effects they perceived with the program; 5)  Areas of improvement and 
recommendations; and 6)  Any final comments concerning the program.  Three focus 
groups were conducted at the three CMP implementation strategy sites for this study.  All 
CMs at each of these sites were invited and agreed to participate in the focus groups.  
There were eight CMs at the independent program site, three at the augmentation site, 
and at the sole provider site, only one CM was employed.  All CMs consented to 
participate in the study. All participants were Licensed Clinical Social Workers in the 
states where they worked.  Content analysis was conducted to explore the themes of the 
focus groups and interviews.  Phrases from focus groups and interviews were clustered 
by themes, creating categories and meaning.  These themes are described below and 
tables 5.12 & 5.13 represent significant comments by installations for each of the six 
major questions addressed during the CM focus groups.   
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Mission, duties, and mission accomplishment.  CMs, regardless of installation and 
implementation method, had a strong understanding of the CMP's mission.  The 
independent program and augmentation site CMs came very close to defining the mission 
verbatim.  The sole provider site participant understood the mission of the program, yet 
defined it through duty descriptions and the strengths and unique restrictions to the CMP 
(Table 4.12 # 1).  All CMs understood that this program focused uniquely on Soldiers in 
the deployment cycle and their families (Table 4.12).  They understood the program was 
designed to provide outreach to Soldiers and families vulnerable to health and mental 
health conditions due to combat stressor exposure.  They developed programs to meet 
this unique mission and to reach out to Soldiers that otherwise might "slip through the 
cracks" as described by a CM at the independent program site.  CMs duties included 
meeting medically evacuated Soldiers at the airport (MEDEVACs), working as 
counselors imbedded in units in health clinics, with deployment and redeployment 
screenings, and re-evaluated Soldiers after a readjustment period had passed (Table 4.12 
# 2).  The Sole Provider CM relayed a comment from a dual Iraq and Vietnam War 
veteran that illustrates the perceived unique value of the CMP: 
When I first started at (the installation prior to the sole provider 
installation) I met a lot of National Guard and Reserve members that were 
also Vietnam War Veterans.  They would sit there and say I cannot believe 
you are talking to me because they remembered Vietnam and no one was 
ever there for them when they got back. So there are Guard/Reserve 
members who as soon as they got back they had to be seen.  (Sole Provide 
Focus Group, December 2007) 
 
CMs reported very thorough understanding of the CMP and appeared to embrace 
and meet that mission.  Commands respected this mission and restricted taskings to meet 
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program scope.  This was accomplished by placing CMs in new positions.  Examples of 
these positions were imbedded in units and at access points to Soldiers including in unit 
medical assets and at health screening sites and meeting MEDEVAC flights.  All 
commands also restricted CM clients to combat veterans as required in CMP policy.   
CMs described pride in fulfilling the outreach mission to Soldiers sacrificing so 
much for the nation's defense needs. One CM from the independent program site reported 
that the program provides services that other programs can not provide by being available 
within the units and very easy to access.  This niche was further described in the unique 
ability of the CMP to provide outreach to combat veterans, to make direct appointments 
after reaching out to Soldiers at medical units and screening locations, and meeting high 
risk Soldiers at MEDEVAC flights and bringing services to them.  CMs, as well as their 
supervisors, felt that they were accomplishing the mission of the program, and described 
both unique strengths and weaknesses of the program. 
Strengths.  CMs describe the program strengths in both simplistic terms and in 
specific detailed ways.  CMs from the augmentation site described the program's unique 
mission as a "neat way to work" (Augmentation Site Focus Group, December, 2007, p. 2) 
because of their placement in the regular health clinics.  This is described as a unique 
strength because the stigma of entering a behavioral health clinic (as the case at the sole 
provider site) or the behavioral health floor of the hospital (independent program site 
"going to the 4th Floor" stigma) of traditional mental health services is removed.  CMs 
can serve as a provider, a consultant and as described by an augmentation site CM, a 
member of the military unit "family."  In other words, this program reaches Soldiers and 
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their families in nontraditional ways.  Being imbedded in unit health clinics, behavioral 
health stigma is reduced; services appear informal and are in fact, less obvious.  The 
independent program site coined the name "deployment specialists" to reinforce the focus 
on their experiences and reducing "conditions of mental health" as the focus of care.  
CMs at the augmentation program site identified their roles with families as a 
unique strength of the CMP.  A mental health Family Advocacy Program (FAP) exits on 
Army installations, however this program has limitations.  The FAP program is a family 
discord referral program that serves families in crisis, after a serious event has come to 
the attention of commands and/or local law enforcement.  The CMP, however, is able to 
serve families in a preventive capacity, before abuse or severe discord emerges.  As a 
result, the CMP is a military program that is easily accessible for families and Soldiers 
before problems reach crises states.   
All CMs report flexibility as a core strength of the program.  Reports of creating 
classes, restructuring briefing delivery for command concerns, and freedom to reach out 
to Soldiers in new ways are examples of flexibility in the program.  Often CM activity 
depends on the activities of units and the deployment cycle of the installation.  The CMP 
can limit direct services to focus on education and screening depending on unit needs and 
installation deployment cycles.  They are not bound to the office, since outreach may be 
necessary and timely.  Furthermore, in some cases a CM will have offices at multiple 
work sites to be more available for Soldiers.   
Another unique strength of the CMP is their non-military status.  All CMs felt that 
Soldiers were more comfortable discussing conditions and some unit conflicts with a 
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provider that did not have the direct military link that an active duty provider has.  
According to the CMs, clients often times perceive uniformed military providers to be 
unable to separate unit issues from Soldiers needs.  Programs imbedded in units, but with 
non-uniformed providers, creates perceived less threatening environments with equally 
skilled treatment providers (Table 4.12 #3).   
Table 4.12 
Mission, Duties, Strengths Focus Group Responses for Site Visited 
 
  Independent Program Augmentation Site Sole Provider 
     1. To assist Soldiers and families w/ To work with Soldiers and  Very vague description provided
  Mission deployment/redeployment issues in     family members with The program became very  
  regards to all deployment related issues deployment related     Clinical: See item 2 
  Can do services that no one else does behavior problems  
  Quickly became very clinical-with a  Don't repeat services already   
     Direct treatment emphasis, see # 2.     provided by other agencies   
     2. Changed a lot quickly Initially thought prevent, consults Like a private practice 
 Duties    original-screening, referral, eval for advocacy, education, direct serv-- more clinical 
     unidentified med conditions classes, briefings, consults. Work at SRP site with 
  Advocacy, linking, teach self advocacy Now, direct services with individls    referrals from Pas 
  Heavy direct service    families and groups  90 day Soldier group briefings 
  individual therapist, care coordination Also Sold Readiness Prg (SRP)&  prevention/education 
 
Bfgs, deplymnt/redeplymnt readiness  
   assessments, Medical evacuations    Reverse SRP (Pre- and Post 
outreach cool kids group  
  developed, but no participation
  
  deployment screenings & brfgs) 
  
      
       3. Doing great, and as intended No "4th floor" stigma Being able to have flexibility 
 Strengths Key that we are in the clinics They see us by walking  Working ONLY directly with 
 It fills a niche   thru the regular health clinic   Soldiers coming back from 
 Catches Sold. otherwise missed We can just let them walk-in   deployments is great. 
    or would fall thru the cracks PA's walk Clt down to see us Vietnam Vets report it is great 
  Better at reaching out to S that BH We are part of the family    that we are here for them 
  Gets rid of stigma We are preventive,     right when they come back 
  Separate from Behavioral Health     FAP is not That I am a civilian 
  Emphasizes families Family intervention before crisis  That we are out of the military 
  More career safe/stigma free I think it's a really neat    culture 
  One on one/ personal   way to work  Combats fears that uniformed 
  Gets rid of the large organization Easily accessible    providers will tell their cmds 
     
     




Unintended effects.  When assessing program implementation it is customary to 
inquire about positive and/or negative program impacts that were not anticipated.  The 
independent program site, which served at the largest military installation and had great 
deployment activity, reported severe overtasking.  Overtasking was described as being 
required to work long hours to meet MEDEVAC flights, working over 40 hours per week 
with no compensation allowed in their contracts, and demands of trying to fill their broad 
mission statement of meeting the post combat behavioral health needs of combat 
veterans.  An unintended effect of an unclear mission statement on such an active 
installation is that overwhelming demands are placed on the program.  This, combined 
with reported pay parity issues (described in the next section), limits retention (another 
unintended effect), resulting in understaffing, rapid turnover, and further over-tasking of 
the remaining CMs at this installation.  CMs reported the broad mission statement led to 
excessive roles, which at times are conflicting.  An example of this is the duty of meeting 
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) planes which arrive at a moments notice and conflict 
with the duty to provide individual therapy, resulting in canceling appointments with 
Soldiers already on the caseload.  This, as well as prior appointments, sometimes results 
in CMs working until 10PM on one evening with appointments at 8AM the next 
morning.  Years of this activity contribute to CMs being stretched too thin, resulting in 
fatigue and burnout.  This was evident in several CM comments during the independent 
program focus group; one such comment is provided below: 
Another negative effect is that we are just burned out.  Like just before the 
1st Cav left it was so stressful that you are not emotionally present for 
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them because you are just fried because our caseload is so huge. 
(Independent Program Focus Group, December, 2007, p. 6)   
 
When the independent program CMs were ask to rate their level of burnout on a scale of 
1 to 10 (ten being the highest), four CMs reported 9, one 9.5, and two reported 10.  Some 
CMs reluctantly reported that they are experiencing some PTSD symptoms after 2 to 3 
years of serving combat veterans.   
The augmentation program CMs perceived unique unintended effects at their 
installation.  Their program was implemented under the augmentation model.  Under this 
model they fear there may be an unintended effect of losing their prevention/outreach 
duties due to being so closely integrated into the program that they supplement.  They 
describe a possible "snatch" into "psychiatric mode" which may limit their ability to 
conduct behavioral health classes, educate leaders on behavioral health issues, and 
consult with commands.   
The sole provider program, with a heavy outreach and education component, also 
report unique unintended program effects.  CMs must report prevention and education 
activities for administrative and workload recording/management requirements.  In these 
cases, large and small group prevention/education must be reported individually in the 
reporting system.  These activities are reported in the electronic healthcare reporting 
system (CHCS).  However, the recent upgrade to this system (CHCSII or ALTA) 
exponentially increased the time to record each contact.  CHCSII requires individual 
client recording of all prevention activities.  Such reporting requires a minimum of 3 
minutes for each person for the group training.  The provider may be serving three or four 
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units of 250 to 300 personnel in a one month period.  As a result, electronic recording of 
this CM's services required more time than the actual service itself.  The CM reports a 
1500 case service-reporting backlog because providing services takes priority over 
recording the prevention activity.  A tremendous reporting backlog is an unintended 
effect of this new activity and a programming deficiency in the new electronic reporting 
system.  This recent programming deficiency is a severe time impingement for the sole 
provider program site. (Table 4.13) 
Weaknesses, Improvements Needed and Recommendations.  The CMs were asked 
to identify areas of improvement/weaknesses and provide recommendations for identified 
issues and for general program development.  At the independent program site, 
stigmatization of behavioral health services was identified as the most significant 
weakness of the program.  One CM described an instance in which a leader publicly 
humiliated a Soldier for having an appointment with mental health.  Another CM 
reported leaders laughing and mocking any mental health service use of subordinates.  A 
final extreme example was described as units stalling predeployment briefings and 
screenings.  This stalling was perceived as an attempt to impede thorough deployment 
readiness assessments.  Leaders appeared to stall or avoid briefings to prevent access to 
behavioral health services which could result in behavioral health diagnoses and prevent 
deployments.  Recommendations for dealing with this weakness were briefings/education 
to senior leaders.  The CM supervisor at the sole provider site has a reporting agreement 
with leaders.  If she is notified that leaders deny, discourage, or otherwise limit services, 
she informs their supervisor inquiring about reasons their leaders may prevent or 
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discourage her staff from serving their Soldiers.  She reports positive results and 
improved access to Soldiers through this intervention.  
Another problem, identified at all installations, was inadequate relationships 
among behavioral health providers within the complex behavioral healthcare system on 
the installations.  On several occasions behavioral health providers from other agencies 
were reported as hostile toward the CMs.  At an agency augmented by CMs of the 
independent program, CMs felt their attendance in meetings was met with hostility and 
their services considered of lower quality.  This hostility resulted in uncomfortable work 
conditions, resentment, and indirectly impacted clients served.  The sole provider site 
reported similar challenges with professional relationships between the behavioral 
healthcare service providers.   
CMs at all installations identified needs for more resources and support.  The 
independent program CMs perceive limitations in the contract they work under as a 
limiting factor of their employment.  Suggestions for improvement included having 
behavioral health under one clinic (integrating behavioral health, social work services, 
the alcohol and substance abuse program, and the CMP in one location), forming focus 
groups or working groups among behavioral health clinic staff to air their concerns and 
resolve issues, and having meetings and gatherings to better integrate and unite staff of 
the behavioral health system. 
Most CMs and supervisors expressed a desire for more program development and 
uniformity throughout all CMP sites.  They felt that knowing how other programs were 
being developed on other installations could enhance their programs and encourage 
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development and uniformity among programs.  The development of program and 
resource guides integrating individual program knowledge and resources was 
recommended.  These materials could provide new CMs with such resources as 
flyers/advertising materials, PowerPoint briefings, and lesson plans as well as procedures 
to gain access to units and protocols for working with high ranking leaders.   
Lastly, some CMs reported a need for orientation classes for incoming providers.  
This orientation should integrate new CMs into the military structure (rank system, 
protocol to address high ranking leaders, military protocol and structure, etc) and the 
organization of the Army behavioral health system.  One way to achieve this orientation 
was to integrate providers into the family member military orientation class.  Some 
installations reported such orientation classes for their incoming CMs, but CMs 
interviewed did not report receiving this service uniformly. 
Closing Comments.  A final opportunity for comments was provided to all 
participants.  The augmentation site CMs reported that they felt the CMP was "doing a 
great job, was a really needed service for the Soldiers, and that the providers and Soldiers 
were fortunate that it was created" (Augmentation Site Focus Group, December 2007, p. 
11).  The sole provider site reported that "I feel like I am dong something really important 
and sometimes I can't stop talking about it" (Sole Provider Focus Group, December 2007, 
p. 6) (see Table 4.12).  And lastly, an independent program CM commented: 
We like what we do…but as contractors we feel like second class citizens 
and receive less pay and benefits…because of legal contracting limitations 
we get less perks but still have great responsibilities with our job.  They 
(other equally qualified licensed clinical social workers working on this 
installation) have parties we can't go to; they get rewards we are not 
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eligible for, and receive far more monetary compensation.  We have no 
Employee Assistance Program.  It is really upsetting.  We do like what we 
do and take a pay cut because we like the service we provide.  That doesn't 
mean we like it.  This is kind of the heart of every social worker.  
(Independent Program Focus Group, December 2006, p. 11)  
 
Table 4.13  Unintended Effects, Improvements, Final Comments of Focus Group 
Participants 
  Independent Program Augmentation Site Sole Provider 
4.  Over tasking of CMs Losing prevention piece The coding problem into CHCSII 
Unintended  We end up taking on everything Being snatched into BH Coding briefings takes longer 
 Effects Too many roles & conflicting roles    Into "psychiatric mode"    than the briefing itself 
  Hard to make appts w/ MEDAVAC May lose ability to do   
  spt unpredictable and mandatory    education/prevention piece   
  Stretched too thin Roles shifting to direct service   
  Burnout is an Unintended effect     
5. Needs resources/ more support Better resourcing support Better connections between 
Improvements Pay Parity, make GS job We need time with FRGs   what I do & behavioral health 
Recommended Stigma is the biggest weakness Have program resources or Referrals are hard 
  Stigma and leader intimidation     manual, marketing materials File sharing between agencies 
  Education and collaboration But MEDCOM Brochure  Personal relationships between 
    with units to combat stigma    was great    us and mental health would 
  CMs believed to make 15000 Better communication about    be great 
     less annually than GS peers    overlapping programs Hiring a coder/making the 
  Less resources and supports b/c Orientation is needed,    Reporting/coding system better 
     contract job    Could be integrated w/ FRG    I have a full week of briefing 
  Need services for provider fatigue Yearly meetings    reports to input (1500 clts) 
  Work on interagency discord More info on MEDCOM Have MH under one roof,  
  CMs feel unwelcome with some   mission intent would be     but may not be possible 
     MH agencies they augment   helpful   
        
6. Program works but we are  Great job, really needed, we are I feel like I am doing something 
Closing    Overtasked    fortunate that it was created    really important 
Comments Very successful, but we do way Contract compensation is great Sometimes I can't stop talking 
     too much Christina is a great contractor    about it 
        
Note:  Source – Army Care Manager Focus Groups, Nov-Dec 2007. 
 
Research Question 1:  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) 
implemented as intended?  The CMP was implemented as one of several additional Army 
behavioral health programs to enhance services to Soldiers and their families.  The CMP 
 
 81
focuses on outreach, screening, referral and providing direct services to Soldiers and their 
families with deployment related issues.  Answering this final question requires 
integrating findings from all other research questions to provide an overall impression on 
the extent to which the program was implemented as intended.  Soldier self-report data, 
CM activity and opinion/perception data, and program development information were 
synthesized to address this overarching research question.  As introduced in the literature 
review, the CMP is one of many mental health programs integrated into a new medical 
risk management model.  This model follows an aviation risk management method of 
overlapping and repetitive checks.  In the case of the CMP, it  provides another door to 
help and treatment.  This repetition is predicted to increase problem identification, reduce 
accidents, and increase proficiency.  In the case of the CMP, it increases proficiency at 
reaching those in need.  The CMP is one program in this system of overlapping services.  
The program was implemented to augment existing services and provide an additional 
assessment and service agencies to Soldiers and families vulnerable to serious 
conductions after Soldier combat stress exposure.   
The CMP appears to be accurately implemented to serve those in the deployment 
cycle and with deployment-related issues from the three installations evaluated.  This is 
evident through focus group and interview data that verifies that these are the clients 
being served.  The CMs verify that they have maintained a focus on combat veterans and 
their families.  Comparisons of Soldier self report data and CM activity verifies that 
vulnerable service member categories (as enlisted, male, and White Soldiers) are 
receiving services and their conditions are being treated.  Some concerns with categories 
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of Soldiers and their conditions were identified as vulnerable areas in the program.  
Senior Officer leaders was a category of Soldiers identified as vulnerable.  These areas 
may then need further assessment and services.  Overall however, this program appears 
to be serving the targeted population and providing services to combat veterans and their 
families.   
Three individual program implementation models (independent, augmentation, 
and sole provider) were discovered and their ability to serve the target population 
analyzed.  Although implemented in very unique manners, each program maintained 
combat veteran focus and identified, screened, and served target populations.  Provider 
morale and satisfaction is a program implementation goal as well.  CMs at all 
installations studied reported high morale, several areas of concerns, and considerable 
provider fatigue.  Overall, all CMPs appear to be implemented as intended, serving their 
target populations and addressing target issues.  Chapter VI provides an in-depth analysis 
of these results to include discussion, implications/ recommendations, and areas of future 




DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 The final chapter of the dissertation provides a discussion of and platform for 
understanding and applying the results of the study.  The chapter is divided into five 
sections.  The first section is a discussion of the research questions.   The next two 
sections cover implications, both for social work policy and practice followed by specific 
program recommendations.  The final two sections address methodological limitations 
and highlight recommendations for future research that can build on this study’s findings. 
Research Questions Discussion 
1.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) implemented as intended?  
Several theoretical factors influenced this assessment of the extent to which the CMP was 
implemented as intended.  The first theoretical factor was that the CMP was developed to 
fill a gap in services to Soldiers and their families.  This program was designed to 
supplement existing programs with restricted target population (deploying Soldiers), 
specified behavioral health issues (those with for deployment-related issues), and 
enhanced availability and outreach.  The CMP was developed to be less invasive/more 
available and easier for Soldiers to access than existing Army behavioral health 
programs.  Complementing these goals, the CMP was designed using an aviation safety 
program model which incorporates multiple overlapping programs to identify and treat 
problems so that everyone in need receives services.  Under this model, the CMP is 
intended to provide additional screenings and treatment for behavioral health problems 
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not identified by other assessments.  Lastly, the program was implemented under a 
decentralized, local leader philosophy, referred to as mutual adaptation.  This 
decentralized philosophy is tolerant of differences in programs for local needs 
application.   
 Overall, the CMP appears to be implemented as intended across the installations 
studied despite different implementation models.  Most sites maintained a 
unique/independent program (independent program or sole provider techniques).  
However, some CMPs augmented preexisting mental health programs while maintaining 
their mission focus (as was the case with the augmentation strategy).  This strategy was 
vulnerable for absorption into the missions of the agencies they supported.  This 
absorption threatens to eliminate the redundancy, or repetitive check safety philosophy 
programmers were pursuing to ensure that Soldiers did not fall through the cracks of the 
military behavioral health system.  Regardless of the integration level, CMs all reported 
during focus groups that the mission focus and forward placement of providers was 
maintained.  At some point programmers must decide the extent to which redundancy is 
necessary.  Future investigation may be necessary to evaluate this possibility.   
 2.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) reaching the target 
population?  The CMP appeared to be successful at reaching the target population.  
Although females were treated at a statistically higher rate than their presence in the 
target population, the percentage difference was minimal.  Eighty-five percent of those 
receiving treatment are male, 15% female.  These results indicate that females represent 
4% more of those receiving direct treatment than their percentage of the deploying 
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population.  This heightened rate may be understandable due to previous research 
revealing that females are more likely to report conditions and seek treatment.  In 
addition, females, as the minority gender in the military, may be predisposed to other 
stressors associated with discrimination.  Women's contact with counselors and their 
display of help seeking behavior may also be more normalized compared to men.  In turn, 
some gender role expectations may make it very difficult for men to seek help as they are 
expected to be stoic and independent.  As a result, the target population in regards to 
gender breakdown appears to be adequately reached. 
The CMP did an excellent job targeting enlisted Soldiers, as they comprised 95% 
of those treated and are the largest group within the deploying force (representing 86% of 
those deployed).  Subsequently, a majority of the population exposed to combat stressors 
is being served by the CMP.  It was noted, however, that senior enlisted Soldiers 
(noncommissioned officers) have the highest rate of deployment and the highest exposure 
rate to combat stressors, yet they report feeling less danger, and far fewer depression 
symptoms, and have lower rates of treatment.  Enlisted leaders comprised 39% of those 
treated by CMs, a substantial treatment rate, however, it is still disproportionately lower 
compared to their combat exposure.  Furthermore, enlisted leaders remain slightly under 
represented among those treated.   
Regarding rank, there was an unexpected spike in O5’s (Lieutenant Colonel, 
(LTC), senior leaders) receiving treatment.  Although this was a low number (n=23), this 
spike in services may indicate a subpopulation of senior officer leaders that would benefit 
greatly from services.  Additionally, this phenomenon was not reflected in the enlisted 
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rank of E9, Command Sergeants Major (CSM), who work along side these senior 
officers.  Perhaps then, years of experience could be a potential protective factor as senior 
enlisted Soldiers (CSMs) generally have several more years in service than LTCs and 
may very likely already have participated in combat deployments.  Although beyond the 
scope of this study, the phenomenon could be understood under a theory of survivor guilt 
exacerbated by the leadership decision responsibility of placing those killed or injured in 
the situations that hurt or killed them.  With heightened awareness on the part of the CMs 
and other providers, outreach and assessment could be strategically placed within 
consultations for subordinates.  However addressed, it should be underscored that senior 
officers have an unmet need for treatment in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.  Further 
investigation could better explain this phenomenon. 
The statistical analyses of the target population on the PHDA in regards to 
ethnicity revealed interesting trends.  Whites reported significantly higher combat 
stressor exposure, but reported significantly lower help seeking behavior and mental 
health issues, particularly depression.  Blacks appeared to have the opposite reporting 
trends of the white participants.  Blacks were significantly underrepresented in combat 
stressor exposure yet over represented statically on mental health issues.  Many factors 
may influence these findings.  There may be a relationship between their job positions 
across race that affects the rates of combat exposure for instance.  Although 
understanding this inverse response rate relationship is beyond the scope of this study, 
there are key issues to discuss.  First, White Soldiers should receive treatment at an 
adequate rate, however if they do not report behavioral health issues when surveyed they 
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will not be referred to screening.  Furthermore, if they do not report issues it is very likely 
that they will not seek treatment.  This ethnic analysis of the target population fell short 
on their representation in treatment.  Ethnic background was not recorded consistently in 
the Medical Department Electronic Reporting System.  Therefore, although Whites are 
highly exposed to combat stressors and underreport mental health concerns, it became 
beyond the capabilities of this study to evaluate the military behavioral healthcare ability 
to reach these sub-population at the highest Army levels.  This data is available, however, 
in local files for individual installation assessment in future studies.   
In summary, this study reveals that the CMP does reach the target population. 
However, enlisted leaders may benefit from heightened screening and 
interaction/intervention. In addition, there seems to be a subgroup in the rank of LTC that 
likewise could benefit from heightened, and possibly informal, intervention. 
3.  To what extent is the Care Manager Program (CMP) addressing the target issues?  
Soldiers were screened for PTSD, depression, risk issues, and their desire for behavioral 
health services.  Despite the expected under reporting of issues, 22% of respondents 
identified depression issues, 11% identified PTSD symptoms, and 10% risk issues. 
Furthermore, 6% of respondents indicated an interest in behavioral health assistance.  
 Of those monitored during the six-month period, the CMP direct services 
dedicated 20% to PTSD diagnoses and 10% to mood issues, 29% were recorded as 
general counseling and 22% as adjustment reactions.    Although there were twice as 
many depressive issues than PTSD symptoms reported, depression related conditions 
were reportedly treated half as frequently.  The military healthcare system, as well as 
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national public education, has made great efforts to de-stigmatize the posttraumatic 
effects of war.  This may be evident in the higher rate of PTSD treatment in CM 
healthcare reporting.  Although PTSD treatment seems frequent by comparison, the 
actual report rates of soldiers are much higher for depression symptoms, at twice the rate.  
This standard rating system used in the PDHA Soldier self-assessment measure does have 
some limits.  Depression, related to catastrophic outcomes at times (suicide in particular) 
has a lower threshold for positive screening than the items measuring PTSD.   For 
instance, one of 4 positive depression items constitutes a referral for depression, while 2 
symptoms of PTSD result in such a referral.  This more sensitive threshold may then be 
driving the higher rate of depression symptom reporting than PTSD.  Regardless, this 
study concludes that the CMP is reaching the target issues identified by Soldier self-
reporting.   
Actual treatment issues may be obscured for a number of factors.  Standard 
clinician annotation techniques and limitations at the Medical Department level of 
reporting may obscure actual conditions being reported. Clinicians are trained to diagnose 
conservatively to prevent hasty and loose diagnostic routines, and CMs were found to use 
such loose diagnoses, as general counseling and adjustment reactions.  Furthermore, 
particularly in the case of depression, some depressive symptoms can be accurately 
applied to adjustment reactions due to hardships of life.  In these cases it is clinically 
prudent to use a general diagnosis rather than a possibly stigmatizing Axis I diagnosis, 
particularly necessary in the early stages of symptoms.  These general reporting practices 
could obscure the treatment rates of depression symptoms, PTSD, and other behavioral 
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health conditions for this large scale study.  This reporting was not predicted and could 
not be investigated through the data used in the study.    
Secondly, the vast electronic healthcare reporting system of the Army Medical 
Department is not capable of maintaining more descriptive accounts of conditions.  This 
electronic system is designed to minimize recording time and avoids in-depth 
descriptions of conditions.  This too, contributed to the challenges in categorizing general 
counseling and adjustment reactions diagnoses symptomology.  Local assessments, 
however, can evaluate CM documentation rather than broader diagnostic trends in the 
electronic reporting system of the Army Medical Department.  This issue will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.  
4.  How is the Care Manager Program (CMP) implemented at various installations?  
Local CMP implementation was found to fall under 3 unique programming styles.  The 
unique styles, independent program, augmentation force, and sole provider, resulted in 
different strengths and weaknesses across the CMP.   
 The group of sole providers were too low in numbers to be an independent 
program and also too unique to be readily absorbed into other agencies.  Their 
uniqueness, newness, and small size resulted in isolation and some challenges in 
becoming integrated into the installation behavioral health system. At times consultations 
were challenging and their positions hard to understand with their colleagues.  It was not 
unusual for other behavioral health professionals to question the CMs consultations and 
referrals and express confusion with their positions.  Work is then necessary to bridge 
this separatism for more fluid services as well as the development of positive work 
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environments throughout the behavioral healthcare system.  For this to happen it is 
critical that senior leaders prioritize integrating CMs into the behavioral healthcare 
system.  Although it may be a low priority to senior leaders, minimal acknowledgement 
and management can resolve much of the confusion and/or separatist attitudes that may 
develop through a lack of understanding and appreciation of the role of the CMP in the 
behavioral healthcare system.  It is then necessary to address territorialism in the 
provision of behavioral health services. Since senior behavioral health leaders are in the 
position of most influence of installation behavioral healthcare, this may be the best 
group to initiate further develop in this area.  
 CMPs implemented as independent programs seem to maintain their mission 
focus and also have power in numbers.  This program had clear sub-programs they 
maintained.  Unique programs were developed, with advertising campaigns, to better 
serve their target population and the target issues.  One example of this was the telephone 
care line that provided quick and anonymous information for conditions related to 
deployments.  This program had public service advertisements on local media services as 
well as pamphlets.  The size of the program allowed for resourcing for this program 
development as well as empowered them within the installation behavioral health system.   
This site, however, also experienced continually high rates of Soldier medical 
screenings and intense post-combat services.  The installation is one of the most deployed 
and houses a high rate of infantrymen and aviation assets.  These challenging work 
conditions produce unique work dynamics where CMs report both high levels of burnout 
and job satisfaction.  These CMs reported job satisfaction at a 10 and burnout at a 9 (on a 
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scale of 1 to 10, 1=lowest; 10=max).  These CMs, like the others, were extremely 
enthusiastic about their jobs, highly committed and motivated to the CMP mission, and 
not interested in leaving their jobs.  They did, however, report high rates of 
fatigue/burnout due to working long hours, receiving lower pay than equally qualified 
social workers in other programs, and receiving poor health insurance.  They did not want 
the hours or duties to change; they enjoyed their jobs, understood the need for their 
extended hours, but requested some parity considerations in regards to the perks of their 
positions.  If nothing else, healthcare insurance that could address provider fatigue and 
secondary trauma issues for CMs seems appropriate and deserved.  Most desired was to 
become a Department of the Army full time civilian employee.  This would provide job 
parity with other installation therapists and full health benefits. 
 The augmentation implementation style of the CMP was used at the medium sized 
active duty installation.  This approach integrated the CMs as necessary into pre-existing 
behavioral health programs across the installation while maintaining their unique 
mission.  A benefit of this style was that it strengthened the current behavioral health 
system.  This style maintained the current behavioral health system and enhanced them 
with CMs that were identified to serve the target population.  This style reduced 
interagency resistance by not creating new programs that take time and work into the 
behavioral health system.  Initially logistics were simplified.  Buildings, office supplies 
and support staffs were not needed.  Rather, the gaining agencies merely had an extra 
staff member to integrate.  As a result, management overhead was reduced, proficient 
resourcing systems were used and agencies received extra staff.  However, CM 
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management became an extra duty for the selected supervisor and the resourcing strained 
the programs they were assigned.  This style maintained the current mental health system 
and tried to avoid complicating the existing behavioral healthcare system by not adding 
another program.  However, this implementation strategy produced internal tensions 
within the agencies they were added.  The CMP program manager was strained with this 
as an extra duty.  Supervising CMs actually assigned to other agencies was difficult.  A 
second source of tension was that funding mechanisms did not support the CMs within 
the agencies that they augmented.  This lack of funding resulted in strains on the agencies 
they supported.  Although the augmentation style of CMP implementation successfully 
achieved the CMP mission, administrative and financial complications were identified as 
a weakness of this technique.   
Local behavioral health leaders have been creative and diligent in implementing 
the care manager program as can be seen in the three techniques used in implementing 
the CMP.  Interviews and focus groups with CMs and CMP supervisors identified the 
unique activities CMs used to meet the needs of Soldiers.  The largest and highly 
deploying installation (the independent program) created an anonymous care line to 
provide services to hesitant clients.  A second installation modified psychoeducation and 
outreach to small group process/education sessions for post-combat Soldiers.  A third 
installation enhanced their outreach and education and tailored much of their program 
into a "family practice" style of services where consultations felt very personal.  All 
programs, through creativity and diligence, were able to simplify existing services and 
create innovative services according to the needs of combat veterans and the requests of 
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Army leadership at their installations.  Whether the decision was to design an 
independent program, augment preexisting programs, or integrate a small asset as 
appropriately as possible, all styles molded well to the mission and goals of the CMP.  
5.  How do installations and implementation venues of the Care Manager Program 
(CMP) differ in their ability to serve the target population?  The degree to which each 
CMP was able to reach the target population and address target issues was unique across 
installations, yet each installation appeared to reach the target population in terms of 
gender and rank.  Gender breakdown for those treated across the installations was 
between 81% and 86% male.  The independent program site, located at the largest 
installation evaluated in this study, had the highest male treatment rate (86%).  The sole 
provider program site, serving many National Guard and Reserve Soldiers at 
redeployment, had an 85% male treatment rate and the augmentation force site, which 
was a medium sized active duty site, treated 81% males.  Both of the active duty sites are 
heavy combat arms installations; however, the augmentation force site has a heavy 
infantry-training mission.  This training mission may increase TDA assignments (non-
deploying Army units, in this case Training and Doctrine Command-TRADOC) that had 
a large support (non-combat) staff.  This TRADOC staff may have increased the number 
of female Soldiers and increased their rate of service.  Awareness of the augmentation 
site lowered male treatment rate should be noted for clinical practice and addressed in the 
management of all behavioral health services at this installation. 
 There was little difference in the ability of CMPs to reach the target population by 
rank.  Enlisted Soldiers received the majority of treatment and senior enlisted treatment 
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fell among all CMPs despite the fact that they represent more of those deployed.  
Uniformly, enlisted leaders do not seek treatment at rates that lower enlisted Soldiers do.  
This is despite the fact that they were in direct combat more often.  Senior enlisted 
Soldiers are highly exposed to combat exposure stressors, yet seek treatment at lower 
rates.  This universal phenomenon should be addressed Army wide and not merely as a 
local issue.   
Treatment rates for diagnoses were unique across installations and limited by 
electronic reporting procedures.  The independent program site treated PTSD at the 
highest rate (27%), which accurately reflected the intensity of activity of the Soldiers they 
treat.  The units of this installation are high combat arms and deployed during the heights 
of combat activity during the GWOT.  The second active duty installation, the 
augmentation force site, is the home of combat arms, but deployed to Iraq mainly during 
the initial phases of the war and experienced less combat stressor exposure than the 
previous site mentioned.  Currently, they are preparing for new GWOT deployments. As 
expected then, PTSD treatment is lower than the first site as well, at a rate of 7%.  Lastly, 
the sole provider site, which is a support installation and served National Guard and 
Reserve Soldiers, treated PTSD at the lowest rate of 3%.  This too, can be expected 
because this installation was not combat arms and the National Guard/Reserve Soldiers 
disperse to their states of origin after their initial screenings at the installation.  At that 
point another military program serves their needs.   
There were different treatment rates for mood disorders across the installations 
studied. Within the independent program installation, depression was treated in 10% of 
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their cases, and at a rate of less than half of PTSD.  The augmentation site, which had 
experienced less trauma, treated a higher proportion of depression (13%), and 2% of 
those treated at the sole provider site had a primary diagnosis of mood disorders.  Each 
installation appeared to have a general coding system to defer axis I diagnoses.  This was 
evident in the use of general counseling (25%), adjustment disorders (18%) 
deferred/blank diagnoses (16%).  These general codings have value in mental health 
service provision, but may have skewed this analysis, masking depression, PTSD and 
other mental health conditions.  As stated earlier, local installation evaluations of case 
files can overcome this limitation.   
Although the diagnostic breakdown does appear unique among installations, as 
discussed above, the differences are understandable due to the combat stressor exposure 
of the individual installations target populations and the status of Soldiers served (active 
v. reserve status). 
6.  What are the perceptions and attitudes of Care Managers (CM)?  The perceptions, 
attitudes and opinions of CMs were assessed in three focus groups and supplemented 
with supervisor semi-structured interviews.  This provided rich descriptive information 
about the program as well as development of recommendations.  Overall the CMs morale 
was high and they felt the program was very important in reaching Soldiers and their 
families and providing services to them.   
 CMs report strong mission focus and embedded services that were more easily 
available to Soldiers compared to traditional services.  Each installation took great care to 
place CMs well out of the mental health system and close to units.  This was seen as a 
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great strength of the program, however, at the augmentation force site it noted that a 
"mission creep" may occur, moving toward direct services and thereby limiting time and 
resources for outreach and prevention.  This could limit the scope and intention of the 
CMP at this installation.  Guidance is necessary to inform this and all sites as to whether 
this is a desired program outcome, or if scheduling for prevention and education should 
remain a priority and become structured into their program to preserve this goal. 
 These licensed clinical social workers have been hired to be the "far forward" 
civilian asset serving war veterans.  These providers are screening and treating a very 
vulnerable population.  CMs also must meet Soldiers as they return from war on medical 
war evacuation flights (MEDEVACs) which arrive at any hours.  This resulted in 
overtime hours which can extend past midnight.  Currently, their employment contracts 
do not recognized these extra hours.  This too creates stressful conditions for the CM.  
Burnout and provider fatigue results from the client population served, exposure to 
extreme secondary trauma, and unconventional work hours.  It is essential that services 
be made readily available for these providers to receive counseling and decompression 
from the stressful services they provide. There are numerous creative ways to provide 
this, but it is key to acknowledge the intensity of CM duties and our responsibility to the 
providers that serve this vulnerable population.  One respite may be a contract that allows 
a flexible work schedule.  Within this work schedule CM may benefit from some 4-day 
workweeks, particularly when MEDEVAC missions come in workdays extend to 14 
hours per day.  Ensuring the contract supports consultations for providers is necessary as 
well.  If this is not feasible in the near term, group or individual sessions with a 
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"disinterested" senior therapist on the installation is necessary to ensure the health 
maintenance of these providers.   
 Pay issues as well is an important factor of job satisfaction.  In the case of the 
CMP, there is a reported pay disparity between them and other providers with the same 
qualifications.  Considering Department of the Army employee status could improve pay 
disparity, remove third party contractor expenses, and lift insurance inequities and 
workweek hour restrictions.  Strong movements toward this full time DA status could 
resolve many difficulties reported by the CMs. 
 Lastly, glitches in the revised electronic provider activity reporting system make 
reporting and crediting prevention services lengthy and at times unfeasible.  This glitch 
should be addressed to programmers to make activity reporting seamless. 
 The CMs report much pride in their jobs and understand the value in new and 
unconventional ways to reach Soldiers.  This qualitative data verified program usage and 
revealed strengths and weaknesses in the program. 
Implications and Specific Recommendations 
Policy Implications.  The results of this study have important implications for future 
policy development. These implications range from implementation/monitoring to usage 
strategies.  First, the study results indicate that implementing a program with broad goals 
and laissez faire management styles results in policy ambiguity. However, in some cases, 
this policy ambiguity allows for creativity and freedom. The large installation Care 
Manager Program Care Line is one such example.  This program was centrally developed 
to allow Soldiers and family members who want anonymity to inquire about, obtain, and 
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use services.  This service is not provided at any other installation and was creatively 
developed and marked with flyers and advertisements to prevent those in need from 
falling through the cracks.   
This kind of creativity was also apparent at the "sole provider" installation where 
the caseload was restructured to meet the desires of senior leaders who wanted 
redeployment briefings to be conducted in small groups of 12 to 30.  Through a loosely 
controlled program, the sole provider program responded to leaders’ requests and 
provided this service.  This was evident in the number of prevention briefings made by 
the sole CM at this site.   
In other cases, however, flexibility resulted in ambiguous objectives which 
produced unachievable expectations.  In some cases, a vague mission statement with 
unspecific objectives, led CMs to confusion about the scope of their job.   Furthermore, 
the implications of unclear objectives have resulted in very different programs at different 
locations.  This also creates difficulty in measuring the degree of mission 
accomplishment for CMs, as outcome goals have not been clearly established.  Although 
the intent of the CMP seemed clear to providers, vague policy with laissez faire 
leadership resulted in unclear expectations, mission creep, interagency misunderstanding, 
boundary disputes, and some lack of employment security on the part of CMs. 
CMs do not have job security and Department of Defense (DOD) employee 
benefits.  Despite the fact that the program has existed for approximately 4 years, CM 
currently operate on a contract basis and some CMs report that unintended consequences 
of their work status include “feeling like step children” or being “second class.”  This 
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dissatisfaction was also revealed in reports of lower health care services, disparity in pay 
and rewards systems, and less flexibility in their hours in comparison to social workers in 
DOD positions.  There is a lack of services and psychological support for CMs 
experiencing fatigue and secondary trauma even though their position places them at 
extreme risk for these conditions.  Such disparate conditions exist while many CMs 
reported longer working hours and lower salaries than equally qualified DOD 
counterparts.  This contributed to job insecurity and dissatisfaction with benefits. 
It must be underscored that these conditions did not contribute to stated desires to 
leave the job (or change to a DOD position). This is partially because CMs perceive the 
CMP as vital for treating Soldiers and their families.  The CMP appeared to be a civilian 
equivalent of “front line” or “far forward” services to war veterans and a greatly needed 
niche in the mental health services provided in the Army.  Nonetheless, the implications 
of contractor positions being held past five years include pay and services disparity to 
long time employees and providers of critical behavioral health services. The solution to 
this may be a push to make the CMP employees permanent Department of the Army 
civilian positions.   
A final policy implication weighed heavily on the urgency of program 
implementation at assessment and failure to catch up with policy development.  CMs 
reported policy ambiguity and desires for a guidance manual for providers.  This could be 
addressed by reserving slots at the bi-annual centrally funded Army behavioral health 
short course 5-day training.  Two or three of the numerous breakout sessions could be 
reserved for CMs where these issues could be addressed.  In addition, a CM document 
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committee could be established to work together to create a CMP manual.  CMs could 
also bring electronic copies of their individually developed resources.  An electronic 
library of resources could then be developed, distributed at the conference and posted on 
the website.  Furthermore, the extensive Army Community Services “Operation Ready” 
counseling resource guide could be distributed as a training resource.  
Practice Implications.  This study revealed several implications for practice for the CMP 
and other behavioral health services in the Army.  One such implication is that even 
though depression symptoms had the highest reporting rate, treatment for depression was 
low in comparison.  Data indicate that some destigmatization of PTSD has occurred in 
the military, leading to higher rates of treatment and reporting among those hardest to 
serve (NCOs, lower enlisted) services. However, mood disorders were reported at twice 
the rate, yet treated at half the rate of PTSD.  PTSD education, destigmatization, and 
treatment appeared to have made some advances, but depression treatment and education 
may need heightened attention. 
 Prevention services seemed to be effective across all installations studied.  CMs 
were able to integrate prevention/outreach and education services into their practice 
among all three sites studied.  There were some inquiries made regarding whether the 
Army Medical Department prioritized such services, however.  The implications of 
ambiguity on these issues include disparate services and priorities across installations, 
and a lack of prioritization of tertiary services, outreach, prevention and education. 
 Contributing to the possible elimination of prevention services is the inability of 
some CMs to enter this activity into the electronic healthcare reporting system.  The 
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military electronic health reporting system drives and substantiates workload activity, 
justifying worker positions, and ultimately the staffing rates at installation. By not 
providing coding options, healthcare accounting systems devalue preventive services, 
exacerbate emerging conditions, and inhibits outreach and education to support systems.  
One installation, Ft Polk, has been successful at developing a time intensive, but effective 
method of crediting this prevention service.  Note that this was the installation where 
senior leaders requested intense prevention and education be provided to their services.  It 
is then necessary to establish the intent of CM services and provide a universal and 
timely method of reporting the services in the healthcare system.   
Limitations 
This multi-method, triangulated study involved the integration of several 
secondary quantitative data sources and qualitative data sources.  It’s not unusual to 
encounter challenges when using secondary data and this study was no exception.  One 
challenge was that PDHA data provided by the Department of the Army was only made 
available in the form of aggregate summary rather than specific case data.  This limited 
the options for statistical analysis in this study.   Also, CM service records did not include 
the ethnicity of clients, disallowing an examination of differences among ethnic groups.   
This overall program evaluation was further limited by constraints of data 
reporting in the medical department. In addition, clinical outcome descriptions were not 
available in the Army Medical Command electronic reporting, and some vague diagnoses 
weakened diagnostic rate analyses while dispositions were not well documented.  These 
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limitations can be overcome, however, through local record analysis and are necessary in 
protecting the privacy of clients and maintaining their receptivity to treatment.  
Future Research 
Directions of Future Research.  Implementation-process evaluations are necessary initial 
components of the cycle of program evaluation that establish the actual program in place.  
These evaluations verify the actual program and provide a type of program baseline for 
future research.  For essential service evaluation, outcome studies are then possible.  
Future research for the CMP should emphasize outcome studies on individual 
installations.  Numerous evaluation designs would be appropriate for outcome studies of 
the CMP.  One such study should include outcome evaluation within the CMP, 
evaluating outcomes and length of care by conditions treated.  Designs could also include 
experimental and quasi-experimental studies comparing treatment outcomes for CMP 
clients and those using other mental health services on installations.  Regardless of the 
design, as emphasized by the Deputy Surgeon General, bringing the best services to those 
participating in combat is essential and this includes evaluating and developing the 
programs in place.  For these reasons, outcome studies of the CMP are priority directions 
in future research. 
 Research investigating the unexpected findings of this study is a second area 
recommended for future research.  Future research investigating the disparity of senior 
enlisted Soldiers (Noncommissioned Officers) in combat stressor exposure and interest in 
assistance and reporting of mental health issues is necessary.  It is recommended that this 
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investigation be stratified by race and gender as well, particularly to investigate the 
inverse statistical relationship across PDHA items among Whites and Blacks.   
 Another recommendation for future research is to incorporate the PDHA follow-
up assessment (PDHRA), now in its pilot phase, into studies.  The PDHRA is a 
reassessment of Soldiers returning from war at the 90 to 180 day window.  Both 
assessments combined would establish a multiple baseline, as well as reveal symptom 
manifestation over time.  When used in outcome studies at individual installations, a 
cycle of symptomology, reaction to treatment, and services provided can be assessed.  
This research would be groundbreaking because symptom manifestation in real time for 
combat veterans has never been monitored prior to the GWOT.  For practice purposes, 
this combination provides an integrated database of available client data therefore 
allowing for a more holistic understanding of both the client and the condition. 
 Further investigation into the high reporting of depression symptoms but lowered 
treatment of the condition is also critical.  Depression symptoms were identified at the 
highest rate, but mood disorders were treated infrequently by CMs.  Investigations with 
recommendations for treatment and outreach development are then necessary in the 
future to increase the quality of life for combat veterans and their families as well as to 
decrease the rare likelihood of catastrophic (suicidal) outcomes for our veterans with 
symptoms of depression.  Furthermore, effective early diagnosis and treatment can 
prevent such occurrences.  Local installation individual file assessment can also better 
determine the true rate of provided treatment and prevention of depressive symptoms. 
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 A last recommendation in future research involves the spike in O5 leaders, 
Lieutenant Colonels in mental health treatment for the CMs studied.  This spike indicates 
a vulnerability that may have been unidentified previously and whose treatment can 
increase the quality of senior leadership as well as have a valuable impact on the 
thousands of subordinates the serve under them. 
Conclusion 
The Care Manager Program was an innovative program developed to improve services to 
Soldiers who have participated in levels of combat not seen in recent years.  It was timely 
and essential to assess the program.  The providers and supervisors welcomed the 
assessment, openly provided information and documents, and eagerly invited findings 
and recommendations for change.  It is often underscored within the discipline of social 
work that the way to best serve the target population is through a continued cycle of 
program assessment and development.  It was the purpose of this dissertation to provide 
the baseline and implementation/process information to understand the CMP in place 
across installations. This study provided this understanding, verifying the CMP’s ability 
to reach the target population and address the issues critical to Soldiers returning from 
war across implementation techniques. Throughout the study, this researcher noted that 
the CMP providers were dedicated to serving combat veterans and their families. This 
study reveals that their efforts are effective at reaching combat veterans and serving their 




Post Deployment Health Assessment Mental Health Specific Questions Sections 
 
POST-DEPLOYMENT Health Assessment DD FORM 2796, APR 2003 
 
Authority: 10 U.S.C. 136 Chapter 55. 1074f, 3013, 5013, 8013 and E.O. 9397 
Principal Purpose: To assess your state of health after deployment outside the United States in support of 
military operations and to assist military healthcare providers in identifying and providing present and future 
medical care to you.  Routine Use: To other Federal and State agencies and civilian healthcare providers, as 
necessary, in order to provide necessary medical care and treatment.  Disclosure: (Military personnal and 
DoD civilian Employees Only) Voluntary. If not provided, healthcare WILL BE furnished, but comprehensive 
care may not be possible. 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each question completely and carefully before marking your selections. 
Provide a response for each question. If you do not understand a question, ask the administrator. 
 
7. Did you see anyone wounded, killed or dead during this deployment? 
(mark all that apply) 
Yes - coalition  
Yes - enemy  
Yes - civilian 
No 
8. Were you engaged in direct combat where you discharged your weapon? 
Yes ( land sea air ) 
No 
9. During this deployment, did you ever feel that you were in great danger of being killed? 
Yes 
No 
10. Are you currently interested in receiving help for a stress, emotional, alcohol or family problem? 
Yes 
No 
11. Over the LAST 2 WEEKS, how often have you been bothered by any of the following problems? 
Some   A Lot   None 
       Little interest or pleasure in doing things 
       Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 
       Thoughts that you would be better off dead or hurting yourself in some way 
 
12. Have you ever had any experience that was so frightening, horrible, or upsetting that, IN THE 
PAST OMNTH, you .... 
No Yes 
 Have had any nightmares about it or thought about it when you did not want to? 
 Tried hard not to think about it or went out of your way to avoid situations that remind you of it? 
 Were constantly on guard, watchful, or easily startled? 
 Felt numb or detached from others, activities, or your surroundings? 
13. Are you having thoughts or concerns that ... 
No Yes Unsure 
 
  You may have serious conflicts with your spouse, family members, or close friends? 
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